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**FOREIGN  
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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-030

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27 July 1994

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## ARMED FORCES

### Edict Reducing Mobilization Capacity, Mobilization Reserves

94UM0502C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 4

[Edict of the President of Russia "On the Reduction of  
Mobilization Capacity and the Mobilization Reserve"]

[Text]

#### On the Reduction of Mobilization Capacity and the Mobilization Reserve

With a view to bringing the mobilization plan of the  
economy in conformity with the changed international  
situation and the reduction in the unproductive burden  
on the economy, I decree:

1. For the government of the Russian Federation to  
present for confirmation, within a 2-month period, the  
basic indicators of the mobilization plan of the economy,  
having stipulated in the appropriate manner:

a reduction in the level of mobilization capacities and  
the mobilization reserve by a multiple factor in compar-  
ison with the existing one;

the inclusion in the mobilization plan of the economy  
the production of a narrow range of critical types of  
arms, military equipment, and other military products;

the withdrawal from the mobilization plan of the  
economy of industries for the output of products with a  
lengthy production cycle;

the restriction of the size of the mobilization reserve  
by the existing requirements.

2. For the Government of the Russian Federation:

within a month, to establish a procedure for the  
removal of the previously established tasks for the reduc-  
tion of mobilization capacities and the mobilization  
reserve, the further maintenance of which will be recog-  
nized as inexpedient;

within a month after establishment of the basic indi-  
cators for the mobilization plan of the economy, to  
announce its indicators within the framework of a state  
order to the executors;

3. To establish that a state order in part of the mobi-  
lization plan of the economy can be placed only in  
enterprises that have orders for current production of  
analogous products in peacetime. The involvement of  
enterprises on the basis of the mobilization plan of the  
economy in the output of production other than in their  
designated specialization [neprofil'noye proizvodstvo]  
(assimilation of enterprises) effected exclusively on the  
grounds of decisions of the Government of the Russian  
Federation.

4. In accordance with the procedure being established by  
the Government of the Russian Federation:

to allow enterprises assimilated under the output of  
arms, military equipment, and other military production  
in accordance with the mobilization plan of the economy  
(except ammunition and special types of fuel) to cancel  
tasks for the preservation of mobilization capacities with  
the simultaneous reduction of the mobilization reserve  
in accordance with changes in the state defense order;

to allow enterprises to cancel orders for the preserva-  
tion of mobilization capacities for the production of  
arms, military equipment, and other types of fuel (except  
ammunitions and special types of fuel), the output of  
which was discontinued before 1991, with the corre-  
sponding reduction of the mobilization reserve;

to allow enterprises to use and sell the material assets  
(with the exception of arms, military equipment, and  
special types of fuel), including equipment, buildings,  
and installations freed as the result of the reduction of  
mobilization capacities;

5. To establish that the financial resources of the enter-  
prises that are formed as the result of the reduction of  
mobilization capacities and the mobilization reserve,  
after repayment of bank credits obtained for these pur-  
poses, are sent by the various units for the replenishment  
of the working capital of the enterprises and credited to  
the federal budget.

6. To establish that the value of the mobilization reserve  
and the mobilization capacities listed in the balance  
sheet of the enterprises are not included in the value of  
the property for assessment of the property tax of the  
enterprises.

7. To establish that, as of 1 July 1994, amortization  
deductions for mobilization capacities are not effected.

8. The present Edict enters into force from the moment  
of its publication. [Signed] President of the Russian  
Federation, B. Yeltsin  
Moscow, Kremlin  
8 July 1994

No 1483

### Aleksey Arbatov on Budgetary Problems

94UM0511A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 25, 24 Jun 94 p 7

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, director, Center for Geopo-  
litical and Military Forecasts, under rubric "Militaria":  
"More Is Not Always Better: Dangerous Paradoxes of  
the New Military Budget"]

[Text] Sharp contradictions and indiscriminate mutual  
accusations of major political figures over the defense  
section of the 1994 federal budget showed that after two



years of Russian reforms, matters here not only are not on the way to recovery, but probably are worse than ever before.

An entire set of paradoxes and apparent unsolvable contradictions in the sphere of defense policy and its financial and economic support serves as an indicator of clear trouble.

The first is that military expenditures under the first draft budget reached 20 percent (R37 trillion) of the expenditure part of the entire federal budget. They were increased to the level of 23 percent (R41 trillion) by State Duma corrections, but the president, minister of defense and many parliamentarians demand an increase in the proportion of military appropriations to 30 percent (to R55 trillion), while the initial Ministry of Defense request was an entire 44 percent (around R80 trillion).

In principle that proportion conforms to a wartime budget. At the same time, it is generally recognized that Russia now is not threatened by military attack from outside; by the way, this also is written in its new military doctrine. Of course, such a threat is not precluded in the future, but the whole point is that this part (almost 60 percent) of expenditures is accounted for not by long-range work done in advance for the future (advanced weapon programs, experimental development work, in-depth Army reorganization), but for maintaining Armed Forces personnel in their present numbers (2.2 million persons according to the table of organization) and correspondingly large numbers of aging arms and combat equipment. And appropriations for military equipment procurement and experimental development work have been so eroded that they placed industry and science on the verge of bankruptcy (these items dropped from 62 percent of all military expenditures in 1989 to 21 percent in 1994).

Another paradox, as is clear from present budget debates, is the fact that our economy and finances, which are in an unprecedentedly deep crisis, are in no condition to maintain the Army and military-industrial complex in their present size. A further military budget increase (by a proposed R18 trillion, i.e., by 10 percent of all federal expenditures) signifies a sharp growth in taxes and/or an even greater budget deficit and availing inflation, which will utterly finish off the economy. Additional defense appropriations will be devalued and as a result the military will receive even less than they were allocated in the beginning.

The third case is connected with the fact that the ongoing reduction in the Army is being carried out by discharging officers to the reserve with all attendant expenditures—and at the same time, each year the Army encounters an enormous shortage of draftees. As a result the personnel shortage is around 30 percent, and in many units and subunits up to 50 percent. The Army is getting rid of professional military men who wish to serve and for whose training the state already has spent enormous amounts, while boy draftees literally are picked up with

the police; and people insist on a further expansion in the draft and increasing harshness of punishments for evading it.

The list of paradoxical phenomena could be continued, but even without that it is apparent that defense policy has entered a closed, vicious circle, if not a spin, into which it is being drawn by deep-seated internal divisions and miscalculations. It is obvious, however, that a thorough revision of the main guidelines of military policy, of military organizational development and of the entire course of reform is required for a fundamental correction of matters.

In this respect the 1994 budget does not provide necessary steps for realization of priorities, and premises about rolling backward in accomplishing military reform and in stabilizing the situation in the Army and military-industrial complex have been incorporated in a number of directions. The fundamental problem is of a dual nature. First of all, it is that inflated expenditures for maintaining personnel, arms and combat equipment at correspondingly high levels "smother" items of expenditure for full-fledged logistic support and maintenance, combat training, arms and military equipment procurements on the minimum necessary scale, and support of experimental development work.

Under the 1994 budget no further reduction in the number of Armed Forces personnel which correspond to the country's economic capacities and to a substantial relaxation in threats to its security, both present as well as presumed, is proposed up to the end of the 1990's. The present level of 2.2 million persons and the command element's official plan to keep the size of the Army at 1.9 million in the future are unrealistic both from an economic as well as from a sociodemographic standpoint. The Armed Forces transition to a volunteer, contract principle of manpower acquisition (payments, allowances, appropriations for contracts and so on are being reduced) is not being supported; to the contrary, it is being undermined.

With respect to military industry itself—and this is the second aspect of the problem—structural perestroika, improvement of economic conditions and closing of enterprises that lack priority and are redundant are not envisaged here. There are no measures for purposeful, planned conversion of the consciously chosen part of the military-industrial complex, and firms conducting conversion successfully are not being given help. There also is insufficient support by the state order for the best military plants remaining in the military-industrial complex.

Meanwhile, it is quite obvious that if arms and equipment procurements now average 10 percent of the state order of the mid-1980's and still less of production capacities, then even doubling it will not save the defense industry. One can count on an even lesser increase in the arms trade—the world market will narrow in the future.

A further "smearing" of limited resources in a thin layer soon will lead to a halt in backward enterprises and advanced enterprises, in necessary enterprises and in unnecessary enterprises. A chronic shortage of funds for maintaining a much too large army is fraught with a breakdown of order in the Armed Forces and may entail the Army's insubordination and termination of its performance of duties. Failure of the defense industry will evoke a social crisis as a result of mass unemployment. The possibility of effective conversion will be lost forever.

A decline in S&T potential will throw the state back to the level of developing countries and lead to irreplaceable losses of advanced technologies which still also can be used in the civilian sphere. Finally, fulfillment of Russia's obligations under arms reduction and limitation treaties inevitably will be frustrated, with corresponding consequences for its status and authority on an international level.

It is the policy of inertia, the absence of a choice of priorities and the stagnation of reforms which threaten to cause an all-embracing collapse of the Army and military-industrial complex to an even greater degree than a shortage of money. This of course does not mean that the failed economic reform did not affect defense in a most ruinous manner.

At the same time, the experience of the past two years and the present crisis have shown persuasively that radical military reform and purposeful conversion are not someone's political whim, not good dreams and not a tribute to detente with the West. This is a harsh demand of reality, a question of survival of the Russian Armed Forces and the defense industry. This demand cannot be sidestepped, waited out or rejected—the result will be even more destructive.

The only method of fighting the hypertrophy of expenditures for maintaining the Army is to undertake a further reduction in Armed Forces numerical strength in the next few years beginning in 1994, first to 1.7 million, to 1.5 million in 1995, and then even to 1.2 million. It is exceptionally important that this reduction occur only at the expense of rank and file personnel and a reduction in the draft, with preservation of officers and warrant officers (now around one million persons) in the ranks of the Armed Forces. For the transition period (up to 2000) it would be possible to have primarily a cadre army, with installation and arms depot security and simple auxiliary work provided by a minimal draft. Such an army would be the backbone of professional personnel, which subsequently will be augmented by contract personnel (presently 110,000 persons).

Further, one should temporarily stop a large part of capital construction except for housing and depots for the arms and military equipment remaining after the reduction of personnel, after the withdrawal of troops from abroad and after the disbanding of units and formations. (According to certain data, only 10 percent

of expenditures for capital construction now goes for housing, with 170,000 officers homeless.)

Funds thereby saved and additional allocated appropriations must be used for supporting the military-industrial complex and S&T development. Resources should be concentrated in the defense industry in the most advanced, high-technology industries comprising the basis of modern military potential and irreplaceable over many decades.

Carry out an improvement of economic conditions, closing, mothballing and, where possible, conversion of the bulk of remaining industries and enterprises, and ensure creation of new working places.

It is also necessary to increase appropriations for experimental development work, maintaining a high level of military-technical development in order to preserve the possibility of renewing the production of combat equipment in a wide range if necessary.

Finally, it is necessary to allocate sufficient funds for fulfilling disarmament treaties without excessive reliance on foreign assistance. An arms reduction on condition of reciprocity is needed by Russia herself even more than by the West, considering features of the geostrategic and economic situation that are taking shape.

#### **WGF-Central Bank Collusion in Corruption Alleged**

*94UM0510A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET  
in Russian 30 Jun 94 p 1*

[Article by Dmitriy Kholodov: "And Service There Will Seem To Be Honey...: a Military Mafia Exists in Russia"]

**[Text] When people say that an entire army of mafiosi is operating in Russia, they do not even imagine how close this is to the truth. Our Russian Army really is clutched in a sea of organized crime. A well organized, disciplined Mafia structure with its strict hierarchy is coming to us from the West...**

Our General Procuracy and military procuracy have been meekly silent all the while about the existence of a system of corruption in the Western Group of Forces [WGF]. Even they themselves possibly are up to their ears in this system. One can judge the scope of "operations" THERE from how quite recently two trains with military property—a special coating for airfields—heading for Russia from the WGF disappeared without a trace. It is as if we live in the Bermudas, and not in a European power.

In recent time only General Karakozov, chief of the Ministry of Defense Trade Directorate, and General Semin, chief of the POL Service, have been charged with the commission of crimes in public office in the WGF. First Deputy Commander of 16th Air Army General Seliverstov was arrested for taking bribes. By the way,

the latter is regarded as the organizer of a gift which attracted attention: the WGF top leadership bought a Class S Mercedes limousine in Berlin in 1992 through figureheads at a price of over 150,000 marks and shipped it on to Moscow. Soon people began to see Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev in this Mercedes. But when the General Procuracy and Ministry of Security took an interest in this matter, Grachev besieged their noble impulse with a devastating argument by saying the famous: "But Boris Nikolayevich gave me permission!" There, Boris Nikolayevich, is your "middle echelon."

Here is a curious detail—practically all divisions, brigades and the majority of regiments returning to Russia FROM THERE immediately change their command element. It is difficult to say why this is done from a military standpoint, but it is unquestionable that this is an ideal method of covering up tracks. Those who know too much are simply hidden deeper, and those newly assigned<sup>1</sup> are not knowledgeable of previous matters.

Journalist Aleksandr Zhilin, who told in the pages of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI about specific facts of corruption in the WGF, literally was forced to go underground. In his words, he received repeated phone calls and it was declared that now he was a corpse. The article was about machinations right down to underground trade in armored equipment and MIG's, about the sale of synthetic drugs made in Russian military medical establishments, and about the obvious participation of the Russian Ministry of Defense and law protection agencies in this. Nevertheless, the State Duma recently rejected a proposal to examine this "Russian Watergate." The Parliament and president are engaged in more important state affairs—laws on corruption.

A directive from Pavel Grachev about the appointment directly from Moscow of the chief of the Directorate for Sale of WGF Surplus Military Property, although he had his own person there who was in no way worse, remains a mystery to this day. The following fact also indicates the penetration of the military Mafia into central structures in Moscow. While in Germany, Colonel Kolyaskin, chief of the Russian Federation Central Bank Department of Field Establishments, in an abuse of his official position, stole a government-owned Army vehicle for himself and was caught counterfeiting documents, for which he was held criminally liable under three articles of the Criminal Code at the same time. Fourteen Volvo cars were delivered by transport aviation aircraft to this department in the WGF in December 1992. Nevertheless, Colonel Kolyaskin was not put behind bars; the case was closed with a very original wording: **"in consideration of the fact that Ye. V. Kolyaskin is a soldier-internationalist, has received positive efficiency reports and has fully reimbursed for material damage..."**

Just what kind of protectors must one have in order to conclude a case that way, in style? It is strange that they also have not awarded a medal. Moreover, now the Central Bank is recommending Kolyaskin for a general's

rank. This somewhat reminds one of the anecdote about Stirlitz, about whom all the Gestapo were "in the picture" that he was a Russian intelligence agent, but did not arrest him because every dog knew that Stirlitz always would extricate himself. It was no wonder—at one time the chief of field banks did not forget Parshin, chief of the Russian Federation Central Bank Secretariat and Ivanov, director of the Administrative Department, who twice received currency for one and the same TDY trip thanks to the Colonel. And later, in saving both Kolyaskin and unquestionably the honor of the uniform, Arnold Vaylukov, first deputy chairman of TsBR [Central Bank of Russia], attributed this money to representative purposes. As the finance specialists say, one can believe this only for a decent payment.

By the way, the chief of the WGF Finance Service now is in Moscow attempting to open an account in one of the banks—it turns out that it is for the group of forces, which has ceased to exist. If one compares this with reports that the WGF Mafia is preparing an underground network in Germany which will remain there after withdrawal of the Russian military...

The ceremonial reception of the WGF command element planned for 31 August 1994 by Minister of Defense Directive D-29 resembles the 1945 Victory parade. There will be the ceremony at Chkalovskiy military airfield, then the reception by the Russian leadership, a touching laying of wreaths, and the transfer of colors. More than one million rubles will be spent. For some reason this smells of hypocrisy.

Especially in connection with rumors about Mikhail Kolesnikov's retirement from the post of chief of the General Staff and his replacement by General Burlakov, WGF commander-in-chief, who remains without a position after the withdrawal of troops from Germany. (Talk about Burlakov's retirement hardly can be regarded as serious.) By the way, rumors may remain rumors. It will be difficult for General Burlakov, whose army wallowed in corruption, to lay claim to such a post, and the General Staff also will not take him in. But Burlakov will be capable of the position of Moscow District commander-in-chief, and serious cadre rearrangements in the leadership of Moscow Military District possibly will follow in the very near future. A number of highly placed generals will "depart."

Such a development of events does not presage anything good. People mixed up in shady deals hardly will be able to clean themselves of corruption after ending up in fresh water, if only because they may become the target of blackmail and continue their activity, this time under new conditions, which will lead to drawing those same Moscow military into organized crime. Then it will be necessary to reduce the entire Army. Although someone still will reduce someone else. Can you imagine the Mafia armed with tanks?!

In addition, scandalous revelations are inevitable, which will undermine the positions of our military-industrial



complex once and for all. Even now there are many questions that can be addressed to the General Procuracy concerning Colonel Bagdasaryan's (chief of WGF Billeting and Maintenance Unit) brickworks which disappeared and about the fate of computer classrooms which the Germans gave gratis for free retraining of our officers. In general, it would be ideal if the entire WGF leadership retired. Better that they engage in business. And perhaps it is also not worth instituting criminal proceedings. First of all, as it turned out, there is no one to do this; secondly, an initial accumulation of capital is under way in Russia, and investigating such cases means going against the current.

#### Prosecutor on WGF Corruption Investigation

944D0073A Moscow *FEDERATSIYA* in Russian No. 2, 1994 [signed to press 23 Jun 94] p 3

[Article by Yuriy Prokhanov, *FEDERATSIYA* special correspondent: "Clever Business General-Style"—For text of earlier article referred to in first paragraph, see the JPRS Central Eurasia Report; MILITARY AFFAIRS, JPRS-UMA-93-017, 26 May 1993, pages 3-4.]

[Text] An article was published under the above headline in the No. 47 April issue of the newspaper in which Boris Isayenko, the senior investigator of particularly important cases, and Vladimir Yelsukov, an investigator of particularly important cases, of the General Procuracy of the Russian Federation, slightly raised the cover of official secrecy on a "piece" of the criminal case associated with the illegal activity of the Trade Directorate of the Western Group of Forces [WGF], and also of the Main Trade Directorate, its superior, in the then Union Ministry of Defense.

We will briefly mention the contents of the article. Within the scope of commerce that was authorized them, the "western forces" were supposed to buy all that was necessary for the military units by concluding contracts with foreigners, first and foremost German companies. But the Trade Directorate conducted strange trade that became the source of super profits for more than 140 foreign firms. The game was invariably played at the same goal: We were supplied commodities of a low quality, even simply rejects and obsolete fashions, at increased prices. Almost no one took them locally, and to send them to Russia for sale was absolutely unprofitable. As a result, a total of about 100 million full-blooded German marks, not "wooden" rubles, were taken out of circulation. This is direct damage to the interests of the state, and to your interests and mine.

One of the central figures who came within the purview of the investigation was the chief of the GUT [Main Trade Directorate] himself—Lieutenant General of Aviation Grigoriy Karakozov—with whose direct participation a criminal transaction was rigged with the Moscow Invest firm in the 1992 resale of a large lot of Egyptian perfume for several tens of millions of rubles. And so the

time has come to talk about yet another remarkable "episode" in this long criminal story...

When the rather reasonable question confronted the investigators—"But why, as a matter of fact, Invest?"—they looked very intently at a group of military from the Rear Services of Long-Range Aviation of the Soviet Air Force, which was associated with Invest, as it later turned out, through money that was not visible to the outside world. Incidentally, they looked at those who were directly subordinate to Karakozov when he was chief of this Rear Services.

V.V. Yelsukov: The question involves Major General Viktor Yudin, the present manager of the Rear Services, senior officers in the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel—Aleksandr Rogochiy, chief of the commercial branch; Aleksandr Serkov, the manager of another branch, the financial-economic branch, his deputy, Petr Belozarov, and several others. As it appears from very impressive documentary and other evidence (also among the accused is Nikolay Ivanov, the director of Invest), it is impossible to suspect this firm of base ingratitude. A heavy rain poured from its treasury on the gentlemen officers in 1992-1993 in the form of six Zhigulis, two hectares of land in the Moscow suburb of Novo-Podrezkovo—15 hundredths of a hectare each, expensive household appliances, and, of course, pleasantly crisp cash for a sum total of R700 million. It was then that we learned for the first time about a certain secret account that was opened in the Moscow branch of the Vologda commercial bank. It was to it that the generous money came from the firm (for the purpose of deception—through an intermediate point, an aviation unit).

This account, which was classified as a military secret to be kept from outside eyes, proved to be very, well, very interesting. It would seem to be a simple thing, but what maneuvers, simple in a talented way, literally run-of-the-mill, and at the same time not without a certain refinement, made it possible to construct it!

Judge for yourselves. Where do you get the resources? Here is where. At first the simplest possible routine operation was carried out: The authorized budget amount was sent to military units. But after a certain time the stern order arrived: "Return it." It was already being accumulated in a secret account. For financial accountability, forged documents were carefully contrived.

Then the latter-day businessmen of aviation got tired of this "back and forth"—and began to pump what they got from the state directly into an underground business. But the substantial incomes from it again accumulated quietly in the Vologda bank. But in order that the aircraft fly, soldiers be fed, and lights be on in the barracks, they extorted additional appropriations by hook or by crook. At the same time they were guided by a trite but amazingly firm truth: Our state is rich—it will endure.

And although officers were very strictly prohibited from making contacts with mistress commerce by an order of

the minister of defense, they developed rapidly against the fruitful background of general ruin and confusion. The businessmen in uniform bought and resold, at a handsome profit, motor vehicles, agricultural equipment, pipes, and other commodities in demand. For a partial 1993 (the account was sequestered in November), this sweeping turnover amounted to no less than R700 million. When required, noncash rubles were successfully converted into cash and stuck to the hands of the members of the by no means much-esteemed company as, for example, happened with Invest money.

It seems that such a long professional and painstakingly conducted investigation will dot all the "i's." And the impartial Themis, despite the important positions and the big stars on the epaulets, will render what is due to the deplorable military men who forgot about the honor of their uniform and ventured into the stormy waves of such a dubious business.

#### **Edict, Commentary on Housing for Troops Returning From FRG**

94UM0502A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 4

[Edict of the President of the Russian Federation "On Carrying Out the Housing Construction Program for Russian Servicemen Belonging to the Russian Troops Being Withdrawn from Germany"]

[Text]

#### **On the Realization of the Housing Construction Program for Russian Servicemen Belonging to the Russian Troops Being Withdrawn from Germany**

With a view to the effective use of the funds earmarked by the FRG Government for financing the Housing Construction Program for Russian Servicemen Belonging to the Russian Troops Being Withdrawn from Germany, which is being realized in accordance with the Agreement of the USSR and the FRG on a Number of Transition Measures, dated 9 October 1990, as well as taking into account the social direction of the construction, I decree:

1. For the Government of the Russian Federation to take the necessary decisions to grant to the participants in the realization of the Housing Construction Program for Servicemen Belonging to the Russian Troops Being Withdrawn from Germany (hereafter called—program):

a) Tax credits to the end of the current fiscal year in the amount of the funds subject to payment into the federal budget:

for tax on profit obtained for the volumes of work carried out within the framework of the program;

for tax on property being used in connection with the realization of the program;

for value added tax from turnovers within the framework of the realization of the program;

for special taxes for the maintenance of the most important sectors of the national economy of the Russian Federation and for the financing of construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of highways for common use;

b) compensation for effecting obligatory contributions paid into the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation Fund for Obligatory Medical Insurance, and the State Fund for Employment of the Population of the Russian Federation, in the volume connected with the realization of the program.

2. For the Government of the Russian Federation to prepare and even before 1 September 1994 to introduce in the State Duma and the Federal Assembly a draft law providing for the relief of the participants in the realization of the program from taxes and levies.

3. To recommend to the organs of state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation and organs of local self-government the release of the participants in the realization of the program from the established taxes and levies.

4. The present Decree enters into force from the moment of its publication. [Signed] President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin  
Moscow, Kremlin  
8 July 1994  
No 1485

#### **Comment from Vladimir Bogoslovskiy, the acting chief of administration of the Main Administration for Housing Operation of the RF Ministry of Defense.**

By the provisions of the agreement between the former USSR and the FRG on a number of transition measures, dated 9 October 1990, the Protocol to it, dated 13 December 1990, and the Protocol dated 29 March 1993, on additional measures to assist with arrangements for the troops returning to Russia, Germany made available free of charge DM 8.35 billion earmarked exclusively for special purpose housing construction projects.

And here part of the funds have now proved to be "frozen". Because of taxation.

In the interest of the construction of the largest possible number of apartments, the Ministry of Defense (as the client), the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and the Federal Government of the FRG, from the very beginning, advocated that the participants in the program be released from the payment of taxes, duties, and levies. This is also practiced in large international projects abroad.

The question has been raised repeatedly on various levels, beginning in January 1991; however, it has not met with the requisite understanding and there has been no positive decision. In the opinion of the Ministry of

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Finance, release from taxes of the participants in the program "would create an undesirable precedent for analogous decisions in regard to projects being financed from other sources and the adoption of this decision will lead to losses of budget income, for the compensation of which the budget has no sources."

But meanwhile, the funds made available by Germany are earmarked exclusively for the purpose of housing construction, and our Ministry of Finance does not have right to include them in its planning as sources of income.

On the basis of these funds, contracts have been concluded for the construction of housing camps, housing construction combines, and production lines for the construction industry of the Ministry of Defense, as well as for the delivery of building materials and equipment—for a total sum of DM6.08 billion. The balance of uncommitted [nerealizovannykh] funds amounts to DM1.37 billion, which approximately corresponds to the construction of 10,100 apartments in a complex with institutions providing paid cultural and everyday services [sotskul'tbyt] and an external infrastructure.

As is well known, on 7 June 1994 negotiations took place in regard to the housing construction program. The German side declared that prior to the solution of the question of taxation, the still remaining orders cannot be placed. The German side once again underscored the necessity of the full release of all participants in the program from the payment of taxes and levies.

Thus, the realization of the program within the time frame stipulated by the intergovernmental agreements was ruined by fault of the Russian side.

The edict of the President of Russia grants a postponement of the payment of taxes until the end of the current fiscal year in the form of tax credits and instructs the government and the State Duma to solve the question of the release of the participants in the realization of the program from taxes and levies within the shortest possible time.

The decree of the President guarantees the successful solution of this problem and makes it possible to raise with the German side the question of the unfreezing of the housing construction for the troops being withdrawn from there.

#### **Edict, Commentary on Housing for Discharged Servicemen**

94UM05020 Moscow ROSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 4

[Edict of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Realization of the Program To Provide Housing for Servicemen Being Discharged Into the Reserve or Retirement at the Expense of a Grant (Gratuitous Subsidy) Given by the Government of the United States of America"]

[Text]

#### **Edict of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Realization of the Program To Provide Housing for Servicemen Being Discharged Into the Reserve or Retirement at the Expense of a Grant (Gratuitous Subsidy) Given by the Government of the United States of America"**

With a view to the realization of the agreements reached with the United States of America on the realization of the program of gratuitous assistance in the provision of housing to Russian servicemen being discharged into the reserve or retirement, I decree:

1. To approve the text of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America About the Allocation of a Grant (Gratuitous Subsidy) for a Program to Provide Housing for Russian Servicemen Being Discharged Into the Reserve or Retirement. For the Government of the Russian Federation to secure the completion of the indicated Agreement and its signing.

2. Taking into account the humanitarian character of the assistance being granted, to establish, that equipment, materials, commodities and other property (hereafter called—commodities) that are made available or used in accordance with the program of providing housing for Russian servicemen being discharged into the reserve or retirement at the expense of the grant (gratuitous subsidy) given by the Government of the United States of America (hereafter called—gratuitous U.S. assistance program) are placed under a special customs system. Within the framework of the indicated special customs system, commodities are imported into the customs territory of the Russian Federation and are exported from it without the collection of customs duties, as well as other taxes and levies that are collected in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation upon import into the customs territory of the Russian Federation and export from it.

3. To establish that, in case of the use of commodities being imported within the framework of the special customs system for purposes not connected with the gratuitous U.S. assistance program, the commodity is considered released for free circulation, and the sums of customs duties, as well as other taxes and levies previously not collected that are imposed in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation upon import into the customs territory of the Russian Federation and export from it, are subject to transfer into the federal budget in full.

The indicated procedure does not extend to cases of the destruction or loss of commodities due to the operation of force majeure.

4. For the Government of the Russian Federation within a month:

To set forth the procedure for placing the goods indicated in Par. 3 of the present Edict under the special customs system;

to take measures to secure monitoring of the special-purpose use of the commodities that are imported within the framework of the special customs system;

to take measures to ban double taxation of foreign participants in the gratuitous U.S. assistance program in accordance with the international agreements of the Russian Federation

to secure, at the expense of federal budget funds and the budgets of the subjects of the Russian Federation, the financing of the installation of the highway infrastructure necessary for the construction of housing in accordance with the gratuitous U.S. assistance program.

5. To establish that the movement of planes in the air space of the Russian Federation and vessels in the territorial and internal waters of the Russian Federation, which are connected with the gratuitous U.S. assistance program, are relieved from the payment of airport and port levies, customs and other payments established by the legislation of the Russian Federation

6. To recommend to the organs of state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation and the organs of local self-government to relieve the participants in the gratuitous U.S. assistance program from taxes and levies, as well as to extend assistance to them in the realization of the program.

7. The present Edict enters into force from the moment of its signing. [Signed] President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin  
Moscow, Kremlin  
8 July 1994  
No 1486

**Comment from Anvar Shamuzafarov, chief of the Main Administration for Housing Policy of the State Construction Committee of Russia:**

In accordance with the agreement of the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America, concluded during the meeting in Vancouver in April 1993, and the decisions of the heads of states of the "Big Seven" in July 1993 in Tokyo, the government of the United States took a decision concerning the financing of the construction of 5,000 units of housing (apartment or one-family house) for Russian servicemen demobilized principally from the Baltic states.

For this, it is envisaged to allot \$160 million. In so doing, it is planned to build 2,500 apartments or houses and to finance the remaining 2,500 apartments through housing certificates issued to the recipients of housing.

The signing of the agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of the United States on the giving of the grant (which means a "gratuitous subsidy") for the program of construction is planned for July-August of the current year.

The program of housing certificates is intended for demobilized servicemen. They will be issued, not

money, but certificates for the purpose of concluding transactions for the purchase of housing or for investing into new construction. This makes it possible for the servicemen themselves to solve their housing problem. The project also includes the possibility of using mortgage financing as means for an additional program of certificates for the acquisition of more expensive housing.

The housing certificates will be issued with determination of a fixed value in U.S. dollars, but with payment in rubles, and the sum will vary depending on the city selected by the serviceman, the size of his family, and the right to additional space.

The cost of the housing and the validity of the transaction will be verified, and upon completion of the transaction the builder will receive the sum of the value of the certificate

There may be variations to this basic plan, such as gradual payments, and other agreements.

On the American side, the U.S. Agency for International Development has been charged with monitoring the implementation of the program for the construction of housing. Responsibility for the coordination of the activity, by directive of the government of the Russian Federation, has been placed on an interdepartmental commission under the direction of the chairman of the State Committee for Construction, Yefim Basin. The membership of this committee also includes representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Defense, the Central Bank, and other interested ministries and agencies of Russia.

The administration of a number of regions and cities of Russia have confirmed their readiness to take part in a competition for the construction of housing for this category of citizens and to allocate plots of land equipped with engineering services and institutions providing paid cultural and everyday services. More than 30 regions have proposed about 200 such areas for the construction of tenement houses and cottages, and 142 of them have been selected. Now the general contractor for the program and subcontractor enterprises are being determined on a competitive basis.

The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Russian State Committee for Construction have conducted a conference with potential subcontractors and explained the rules for participation in the competition. According to the schedule of the program, the results of the competition will be announced in July-August 1994, the conclusion of the contracts—in August. The completion of the construction is planned for September 1996.

At the request of the American side, the expenses for providing the areas under construction with engineering facilities will be the responsibility of Russia.



## POLICY

### Presidential Commission on Senior Appointments Established

#### Commission Statute

94UM05001 Moscow ROSSIYSKIY GAZETA  
in Russian 24 Jun 94 p 4

[Statute on the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy Under the Russian Federation President]

[Text]

#### STATUTE On the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy Under the Russian Federation President

1. This Statute establishes the order of activity of the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President (henceforth called the Commission) and defines its authority:

2. The Commission is an organ of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President; it performs an expert evaluation of recommendations submitted for consideration by the Russian Federation President on appointment to senior military positions and on conferral of senior military and senior special ranks

3. The Commission is guided in its activity by the Russian Federation Constitution, Russian Federation laws, Russian Federation presidential edicts and directives, and this statute

4. The purpose of the Commission is to ensure realization of the Russian Federation President's authority in questions of state service and cadre policy in the defense and security sphere

5. The following are basic principles of Commission activity:

- accountability of Commission work to the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President;
- collective consideration and making of decisions on questions within the Commission's competence.

6. The Commission's main tasks are the following:

- consider recommendations sent to the Russian Federation President by heads of federal organs of executive authority on appointing servicemen to senior military positions; on relieving them from senior military positions in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, organs and troops of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information

under the Russian Federation President, Russian Federation counterintelligence organs, Russian Federation Main Security Administration, Russian Federation Presidential Security Service, Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, Russian Federation Border Guard Troops, Russian Federation Railroad Troops, Civil Defense Troops and other military force elements; and on discharging senior officers from military service;

- consider recommendations sent by heads of federal organs of executive authority to the Russian Federation President on conferring senior military ranks on servicemen and senior special ranks on employees of internal affairs organs, customs organs and tax police organs of the Russian Federation;
- consider, by order of the Russian Federation President or by decision of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President, other questions of state service in federal organs of executive authority which have subordinate troops and military force elements.

7. To perform its assigned tasks the Commission has the right to request and receive necessary information and documents according to established procedure from Russian Federation state authorities and from organizations and establishments.

8. Commission personnel changes are approved by Russian Federation Presidential directives.

9. The Commission provides opinions or makes suggestions on matters indicated in paragraph 6 of this Statute.

The Commission adopts rules

10. The Commission chairman directs the Commission's work and is personally responsible for fulfillment of its assigned tasks.

The Commission chairman:

- holds Commission sessions;
- distributes duties among Commission members;
- submits reports on results of Commission activity and on other matters to the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President;
- introduces proposals for changing rules for Commission consideration.

11. Decisionmaking by the Commission chairman is allowed within limits of the Commission's competence (with Commission members subsequently informed of the fact that a decision was made):

- when there is a need for a prompt decision on matters of appointment to senior military positions, relief from a position and discharge of senior officers from military service;
- when there is a need for ensuring confidentiality of information on the cadre makeup of Russian Federation foreign intelligence and counterintelligence organs;

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- in deciding questions of the discharge of senior officers at the expiration of their term of military service, when they reach maximum age for being on military service, after they have been declared unfit for military service by a military medical board, and in connection with table of organization measures.

12. Organizational and technical support to the Commission's work is provided by the Federal State Service Administration of the Russian Federation President.

The procedure for formalizing, giving an expert opinion on, and considering documents coming to the Commission is determined by Commission rules and by the Director of Administration of the Russian Federation President.

#### Enabling Edict

94UM0500B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 24 Jun 94 p 4

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 1292 of 20 June 1994, signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin]

[Text]

#### EDICT

##### of the President of the Russian Federation

**On Approving the Statute on the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President**

In order to support the work of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President, I decree:

1. Approve the accompanying Statute on the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President.
2. Acknowledge as invalid Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 1188 of 7 October 1992 "On the Higher Certification Commission Under the Russian Federation President" and Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 702-rps of 16 November 1992.
3. This Edict enters into force when signed.

President  
of Russian Federation  
B. Yeltsin

Moscow, the Kremlin  
20 June 1994  
No 1292

#### Roundtable Debates Military Cooperation

PM0707102794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 6 Jul 94 p 3

[Report by Gennadiy Miranovich: "CIS: You Cannot Build Defense Alone. That Is Conclusion Reached by

Participants in 'Roundtable' Debate at Headquarters for Military Cooperation Coordination"]

[Text] In general politicians and the military of the majority of CIS countries reached this conclusion two years ago when at the 15 May 1992 Tashkent meeting the heads of six states—Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—signed the collective security treaty. This was the first attempt by the leaders of the newly formed states to lay the foundations to a common system of defense building.

Later, in 1993, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia acceded to the treaty. That is, having fixed our boundaries, having divided the USSR Armed Forces among ourselves, and having "carved out" borders, we suddenly saw that in practice not a single newfound state had the strength to safeguard its own security individually and independently. It turned out that true independence could be guaranteed only through the creation of a firm economic alliance and the joint, coordinated solution of defense problems. An intensive search began for options for integrating efforts in the military sphere.

Indeed, this "roundtable" debate with the participation of the leadership of the headquarters for the coordination of military cooperation, the CIS defense ministers council secretariat, representatives of the Russian Federation president's staff, the Federal Assembly, the CIS states' military departments, the center for international studies, and the national and international security fund, and military scientists was the latest attempt at this search.

And it is no accident that the debate focused on what we shall call an approximate model for a system of collective security proposed by the headquarters for the coordination of military cooperation. Now, together with collective military-political cooperation whose nucleus consists of the signatories of the collective security treaty, a process of multilevel military-political cooperation is under way. Of itself this is of course a good thing. But it is proceeding slowly, lagging behind the domestic and foreign military-political and other realities which have been taking shape in the post-Soviet space. There has been no marked headway in the practical implementation of the Tashkent treaty and as before only Russia is fully involved in peacekeeping practice.

Yes, Russia's role in the process of military building in the CIS and the solution of the problems arising in connection with the division of the unified armed forces should undoubtedly be determining. There are objective reasons for that—its incomparable military might, its production and military and scientific potential, and so forth. But it is no accident that the Russian president's speech at the reception in honor of military academy graduates cited as the priority task of our armed forces foreign activity the formation of a collective security system in the CIS. Life itself now dictates the need for an effective and economically expedient security system.

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within whose framework it would be possible to resolve defense problems common to all, from military legislation and technical equipment, the training of national armies and joint armed formations to the legal and social protection of servicemen and their families

In the opinion of those taking part in the debate the most acceptable form of pooling the CIS countries' efforts in the military sphere right now could be a military or military-political alliance within whose framework the creation of coalition defense forces would be envisaged. In this case the collective security council, the foreign ministers council, and the defense ministers council would act as the supreme political organ. The working organs would be a committee of chiefs of staff and a joint coalition defense forces staff. In this opinion a unified command is not envisaged. The question of such a command can arise only if the proposed system is transformed into joint armed forces

At the same time the model provides for the presence of commands for the coalition defense forces in the region. For clarity's sake let me note that in this option for a collective security system it is planned to single out several regions where, in the opinion of experts, it is most expedient to have coalition defense forces sub-units.

In general outlines that is the model for the collective security system proposed by those taking part in the debate. Time will tell whether it will be adopted or whether a different, more acceptable, concept will emerge. So far only one thing is clear: A concept is needed.

#### **Ivashov Reviews CIS Military Cooperation Concept**

944F0964A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 6 Jul 94 pp 1, 3

["Abridged" report of speech of Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, to conference on problems of the collective security of the Commonwealth at CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters, date not given; by Colonel Nikolay Plotnikov, military observer of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "From Disintegration to Unification: Collective Security of the Commonwealth"]

[Text] A conference on problems of the collective security of the Commonwealth was held in the CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters. A report on conceptual issues was presented by Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, representative of the president of the Russian Federation at the Rosvooruzheniye State Company, Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, representatives of the Office of the President of the Russian Federation and defense ministries of the CIS, and scientists took part in the debate. Opinions were

exchanged on the system of collective security of the Commonwealth and the consolidation and integration of efforts in the military sphere. A number of speeches adduced the thought that Russia should, by virtue of many objective factors, play the part of a kind of unifying core in military cooperation. It would be the guarantor of security throughout the post-Soviet space.

In the opinion of the majority of conferees, the correct reference points in the elaboration of a concept of collective security were determined in the course of the debate.

An abridged version of the speech at the conference of Lt Gen Leonid Ivashov is presented for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA readers' attention.

Inseparably connected with the problems of the political and economic integration of the countries of the Commonwealth is the problem of the military security of the states that were formed as a result of the disintegration of the USSR. The Collective Security Treaty signed on 15 May 1992 in the city of Tashkent was an attempt by the heads of state to put a legal barrier in the way of the complete collapse of the military system of the USSR (the defense space) and to preserve if only a minimum level of security for their countries. The treaty itself and the approximately 100 agreements adopted in its development have, indeed, arrested the process of military disintegration, but the problems of the safeguarding of the security of the Commonwealth have not been resolved, for all that. Realities of the present day are the breakup of the unified military system and the single defense space and the low combat capability of the armed forces of the states of the CIS.

The recognition by politicians and the leaders of military departments of the need for a unification of efforts in the assurance of elementary military security presented itself as a way out of the current situation.

Speaking at a reception in honor of the graduates of military academies on 28 June of this year, the president of the Russian Federation cited as a priority measure the creation of a system of collective security within the framework of the CIS and emphasized the particular responsibility of Russia to the other states of the Commonwealth.

The most suitable organizational forms of unification for our situation are:

1. In the form of a coalition of states (allied commitments for a particular period with the absence of unified coordinating bodies and a unified or joint command).
2. In the form of a military or military-political alliance (the formation of a system of permanent political and military authorities and unified or joint military structures and groupings of forces and resources and mutually coordinated operational plans and plans of the training of troops and staffs).

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3. In the form of more extensive military integration with coalition structures possessing supranational powers whose decisions are binding on the participating states, with a common (besides national) military budget and with unified armed forces under a unified coalition command.

In the opinion of specialists, the second form of military integration is the most acceptable for the present state of relations in the Commonwealth. We are passing through the first at this time.

The purposes of the defensive alliance: the creation of a field of trust and security between the participating states; economies in resources and the forestalling of aggressive aspirations and power pressure; the repulse of aggression by joint efforts.

The Collective Security Treaty does not prevent a choice of any of the forms, including the creation of a military-political defensive alliance, as the basis of an efficient system of collective military security in the Eurasian region. I would like to emphasize that we are talking about military security merely as one subspecies of general security.

The efficiency of the system of collective security will depend on a number of components, two of which, in our view, would be supporting or principal components. The first is the level of security of the participants in the system, the second, the state and functioning capability of the mechanisms linking the security potentials of the individual states into a system.

The creation of a system of collective military security is decided by a set of measures of a political, economic, and legal nature and by specific military-organizational measures.

We are entitled to maintain today that a theory of collective security of the CIS and its foundation—a defensive alliance—has not been devised.

Specialists of the Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters have devised conceptual approaches to the creation of a system based on the development of the provisions of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, the charter of the Commonwealth, and other documents of the CIS.

Military integration derives from the degree and depth of integration in the political sphere and in the economy and from the establishment of truly allied, equal relations between states of the Commonwealth. Considering that not all states of the CIS are today ready to an equal extent for participation in a defensive alliance as a full-scale military-political regional organization, it would seem expedient to propose a flexible phased approach to the creation of this alliance, in which provision is made for the possibility of the involvement in it of each participant in accordance with his political,

economic, and legislative possibilities. Closer cooperation within the framework of some groups of states and fragmentary cooperation within the framework of others are not ruled out here.

The collective security of the participants should be based on a number of principles, the main ones of which are: the indivisibility of security; aggression against one participant is regarded as aggression against all the participants; the equal responsibility of the participants for the assurance of security; noninterference in the internal affairs and consideration of the interests of one another; collective defense; the adoption of decisions on fundamental issues of the assurance of collective security based on consensus; the conformity of the composition and readiness of the forces and resources to the scale of the military threat; the possibility of the location of individual military bases and facilities of some participants on the territory of other participants.

In the opinion of headquarters' experts, the building of a system of collective security should be based on regional subsystems with regard to the community of the territories, the nature of the threats, the groupings of the troops, the infrastructure, and other conditions and factors. Each subsystem has relatively independent political, economic, and military components and structures here interacting within the framework of the overall system of collective security of the Commonwealth, at the level of both horizontal and vertical relations. The military component of each subsystem should be Coalition Defense Forces with the corresponding organs of military command and control. A grouping of troops and forces should, essentially, be created in a military theater or operational sector. The Coalition Defense Forces constitute the basis of the Joint Armed Forces, which could also include reserves, unified systems for the entire Commonwealth, and coalition operational combined naval units, and other components.

The organs of command and control of the Coalition Defense Forces and the Joint Armed Forces should have supranational powers on a number of issues concerning combat readiness and the combat and operational training of the troops (forces) and their control in peacetime and in wartime. Supranational authority should be delegated to the coalition organs of military command and control by the Collective Security Council and enshrined in the national legislation of the participants.

Decisions on the fundamentals of military policy, military organizational development, the methods of repulsing aggression, and other important issues should be adopted by the highest political bodies of the system of collective security on the basis of consensus. Questions of the use of troop groupings in the corresponding operational sectors, the covering of borders, the stockpiling of material resources, the development of the infrastructure, and others may be decided at the regional level by the authorities of the states concerned.

Specific tasks of the combat readiness of the armed forces and their training, manning, and logistical support



and of the maintenance of a stable situation on its borders pertain to the functions of each participant.

A possible version of the building of a system of collective security could be as follows:

East European region: Western European area of the Russian Federation, the territories of the Republic of Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast.

Caucasus region: North Caucasus area of the Russian Federation, the territories of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Georgia.

Central Asia region, territorially divided into western and eastern zones: Western zone of the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan; Eastern zone, the Urals-Siberian area of the Russian Federation, territories of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

East Asian region: eastern area of the Russian Federation and the Eastern Oblast of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

A political-economic body (Defense Council) and a coalition command of the grouping of troops is formed for ensuring security and organizing the defenses in each of the said regions. In peacetime the council concentrates efforts on maintaining peace and stability in the region and settling contentious problems and crises exclusively by political conciliation means, at the same time maintaining the defense potential at the necessary level. In the event of aggression, the council is entrusted with responsibility for organizing the repulse of the aggression and defeating the enemy.

The participation in the regional subsystems of collective security of states that have not acceded to the Tashkent Treaty (Moldova, Ukraine, Turkmenistan) is not precluded but, rather, contemplated. The nature of this participation could be fragmentary, that is, in respect to individual issues (the guarding and opening of sections of borders that are the external borders of the Commonwealth, air defense, cooperation in military production, use of the infrastructure, and so forth).

The central coordinating bodies of the system of collective security of the CIS should be: the Collective Security Council, the defense and foreign ministers councils, the general secretary of the Collective Security Council, the Military-Economic Commission of the CIS, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters.

The creation for wartime (in a period of threat) of a Supreme High Command of the defensive alliance and its working bodies, with it being accorded supranational powers for leadership of the repulse of the aggression, would seem expedient.

This is a highly schematic outline of the military structure of a system of collective security of the CIS. It will undoubtedly need to be made more specific and to be developed further. The creation of such a system in the

Eurasian region is not a revival of bloc confrontation. It is a bearing along the route of the assurance of peace and stability corresponding to the interests of the peoples of the countries of the Commonwealth and the interests of the world community.

#### **Deputy Defense Minister on Reform, Conversion, Politics**

94UM0495A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 26/51, 1-7 Jul 94 p 4

[Interview with First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Kokoshin by Yegor Yakovlev under rubric "The Professional": "Andrey Kokoshin Is the Guest of Yegor Yakovlev: National Security: A Search for the Optimum Between Swords and Plowshares"; photograph of Kokoshin included]

[Text] [Yakovlev] Previously there was not even a desire to clarify something about the Ministry of Defense, just as about the KGB, by the way. If the person you were talking to did let a word drop, the censor still would cross it out. But now why not ask you: What are the duties of a first deputy minister of defense?

[Kokoshin] The main part of the work consists of questions of the defense economy. It is quite obvious that mutual relations between state and Army, Army and local authorities, and Army and product suppliers have changed radically. One has to locate and marshal new relations on the move while also taking advantage of world experience. And not simply count money—one always was supposed to save money, but it is true that this was far from always done... It is necessary to analyze and forecast the development of the domestic economy as a whole and of various industrial sectors and work out cooperation with a multitude of organizations and departments and with Federation components. All this forces one to frequent the government and parliament, associate with experts and travel throughout the country. Many problems of combat training and Armed Forces structure, not to mention Army and Navy social problems, also stand out in relief today through economics and questions of financing. A significant part of my duties consists of Ministry of Defense military-technical policy. By the way, we constantly coordinate it with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guard Troops, Federal Counterintelligence Service and Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information.

In the absence of the minister of defense, I carry out his duties under the existing procedure, and this in turn obligates me to be knowledgeable on all matters, from military-political problems right down to particular incidents in the Army and Navy.

[Yakovlev] Like the majority of people, it is not given to me to understand sums with an astronomical number of zeroes. And of course I am not undertaking to judge who is right: the legislators who did not want to provide additional trillions for you in the budget, or you who attempt to

prove that these trillions are needed. But it seems to me there is another important point in the discussion which unfolded over the military part of the budget. For many years, beginning with Khrushchev's times, not to mention the era of "new thinking," we all were inclined to think one thing: the more it was possible to snatch from defense, the better all of us would live. And probably only now did it resound rather harshly in the course of the aforementioned discussion that if you wish to have a worthy army, pay for it.

[Kokoshin] I fully agree with your observation about such an oversimplified approach. According to it, we automatically received benefits for our economy by having reduced expenditures for arms. Of course, it is difficult for the uninitiated to judge particular budget amounts. It is very important to understand the situation in which the Army found itself in the last two years. Above all, the Armed Forces suffered deeply from disintegration of the unified army. Russia has been carrying out such a massive withdrawal of troops in such compressed time periods previously unknown to anyone. As a result, a real threat arose somewhere at the beginning of 1992 of losing controllability of the Armed Forces. Add to this that the manufacture of military products fell 7-9 times in 1992 compared with 1991 due to reduced government financing, although even then it already had been reduced for many directions. Expenditures for scientific research had been reduced radically by government decisions made at the beginning of 1992, and presently there are no hidden expenditures of any kind for defense, despite certain statements here and in the West. Finally, there has been almost a complete halt to construction of housing which officers could count on, except with funds from the defense budget.

In short, the pendulum swung from one extreme to the other, as often has happened in Russian life. From extraordinary militarization, when 30-35 percent of our country's gross domestic product [GDP] was being spent in one way or another for military needs (and some assert that it was even more than 40 percent), the pendulum moved swiftly to exactly the opposite side: now it is a question of five percent of GDP.

All this led me to the conviction that now was when an acute need had arisen for political decisions with respect to the Armed Forces and the defense industry: an understanding of the Army's role as a guarantor of social stability in the country and of our authority in international affairs, including for success in winning world markets, especially in science-intensive products. The optimum between swords and plowshares still has to be determined in ensuring Russia's national interests and our national security.

[Yakovlev] You defend interests of the Army and defense industry with a conviction which generals might envy. Just how did it happen, nevertheless, that you, strictly a civilian person known to all of us from scientific works and from the USA and Canada Institute, suddenly ended up in the very heart of the Ministry of Defense?

[Kokoshin] I must say right off that defending the necessary level for ensuring the country's defense capability is for me a very important part of ensuring our national interests as a whole. While working in the USA and Canada Institute, for many years I dealt with our national security policy, participated in developing various military-political topics and worked a great deal together with heads of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff. The fact that I completed Moscow Higher Technical School imeni Bauman, that I received a rather intensive military training as a reserve officer, and that the topics of my course work and degree work in electronics were linked directly with defense subjects played its role in the fact that I dealt with these problems.

I cannot say I was very successful in my basic specialty at Moscow Higher Technical School: even then I was fascinated with social sciences, including our military history.

I myself come from a military family. I know what military service is from more than hearsay: my father, my grandfather and all brothers of my father and mother are military people. I grew up in a military home on Tishinskaya Square. We had a fairly good library on military equipment and military history. In those times, when books of banned authors as a rule were being destroyed, Grandmother saved them for me. Thus for the first time I opened the memoirs of White generals Denikin and Lukomskiy and the works of Red commanders subsequently repressed in the 1930's. My first book, a gift from my father, was a biography of Suvorov in works of Russian art.

[Yakovlev] Still, how did you end up in the Ministry of Defense?

[Kokoshin] At one time there was a discussion of what kind of person the minister of defense was to be. Some believed he should be a civilian. Others insisted on a military man.

[Yakovlev] I remember this discussion back before Grechko's appointment as minister of defense. After the death of Marshal Malinovskiy in 1957 they began talking about a civilian minister from the example of the United States, where McNamara was at that time. I remember what Khadzhi Mamsurov, first deputy of our military intelligence, said to me at that time concerning this: "Inasmuch as a U.S. Army lieutenant receives more than me, a colonel general, even a civilian can be minister of defense there. But here, where it is not pay, but drill and discipline that hold up the Army, there is nothing for a civilian to do—only a military man!" Was Mamsurov right?

[Kokoshin] To a certain extent he was right for his time, just as the president was right when he appointed a

military man as minister of defense in 1992. I believe the Army was not ready for this post to be held by a civilian, especially during the difficult situation in which it found itself in 1991-1992.

**[Yakovlev]** Why did the president decide specifically in your favor?

**[Kokoshin]** It is hard to say; to this day I do not know how that decisionmaking process developed. I had occasion to accompany Boris Nikolayevich on his first official trip to the United States as president of Russia. I had met him several times, but of course he knew little about me. Evidently a discussion in the press on the question of who was to be Russian minister of defense played its part. General designers of defense design bureaus, military centrists and democrats mentioned my name.

**[Yakovlev]** An official proposal finally came?

**[Kokoshin]** Viktor Vasilyevich Ilyushin unexpectedly phoned to say the president wanted to see me. A Presidential Council was being held in the Great Kremlin Palace on 10 April 1992 in which you probably also took part. The president emerged from the room where the Council was taking place and said he was only slightly familiar with me but had been told more than once that my candidacy was suitable for work as first deputy minister of defense. He added that he himself would be acting minister of defense for several months. He said that Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev also would be appointed first deputy. I was not about to take time to reflect—I responded that I agreed.

Both Grachev and I understood that urgent decisions were needed with respect to ensuring controllability of the Armed Forces—this institution seemed to be outside the historical system of coordinates, without proper reference points. The officer corps could in no way determine its place in the CIS Armed Forces. It was clear to us what enormous might there was in the hands of our Army, and it could become extremely destructive not only for our country, but also for the entire international community. I can say without exaggeration that I was moved by a specific historical idea: that point in time had come when it was impossible to engage only in analytical work—we had to harness ourselves and engage in rough everyday work while not forgetting about long-range goals and missions and about those problems on which I had been working for years. This abundance of general, rough everyday work helped establish normal and largely also comradely relationships with Grachev, with the chief of the General Staff and with other deputies. Some of my friends said I had lost my mind: you can continue to write books and articles, lecture in prestigious universities, and be of practical benefit by taking part in politics—with advice, of course. By the way, you all also probably experienced this when you agreed to go head up Ostankino...

I had occasion to be occupied with political military history even before. It was as if I passed our historical

traumas through myself. One of the most terrible was the trauma of 1941. More than once I turned to a study of this time. I even dreamed about 1941 repeatedly, although I was born in 1945.

**[Yakovlev]** The tragedy of 1941 is inseparable from the overall tragedy of the country and state.

**[Kokoshin]** For me it is organically interwoven above all with the tragedy of 1937-1938.

**[Yakovlev]** Had our generals not been destroyed four years before, 1941 could have been different?

**[Kokoshin]** It was not just the generals who were destroyed, but also many thousands of educated senior and even junior officers, although I am not at all an admirer, for example, of Tukhachevskiy, the lieutenant, who became army and front commander too quickly...

In general, during the Civil War there were three categories of general and flag officers. The first consisted of Czarist Army generals and colonels who went over to the Bolshevik side. Then there were lieutenants and warrant officers such as Tukhachevskiy and Uborevich. Finally, there were the sergeant majors. For example, Budenny was a brilliant tactician with very poor orientation in operational art, not to mention strategy. And there were very complex relationships among all these categories. Initially the lieutenants together with the sergeant majors contributed to moral and physical destruction of the generals in the late 1920's. Later they began to settle scores with each other.

The beginning of the tragedy of 1941 was during 1928-1929. At that time Svechin, a former Czarist Army general, probably the most outstanding mind of Russian military science and without exaggeration a 20th century Clausewitz, was crushed with Tukhachevskiy's direct involvement. Already at the end of the 1920's he described the initial period of World War II as no one else had. He predicted that Poland would be Germany's first victim in the upcoming world war and that Poland would be crushed in a very short time. And he warned us to expect no swift victories, that a difficult, protracted war lay ahead. In its first stage it would be necessary to rely on a strategic defense before we acquired the capability to attack. Only by having exhausted the enemy, somewhere in the vicinity of Smolensk, would the Red Army be capable of delivering the first strategic counter-thrusts. Svechin was accused (including by Tukhachevskiy) of defeatism, bourgeois sponging, and so on. I digressed from the discussion of today's topics, but not by chance. This past continues to influence us. For decades after World War II a significant part of our military planning efforts was aimed at replaying 1941. And the vector of our military-political and military-strategic thinking to a considerable extent was acting in the wrong direction, which also had a negative effect on the defense economy and consequently also on the country's economy as a whole.



[Yakovlev] I would like to return to the Army reform about which people spoke and wrote unceasingly for all the years of perestroika. Now they do not recall it. So did reform happen or not? Speaking of "dedovshchina," it has not decreased, and the criminal base in the Army has grown even more.

[Kokoshin] Reform is going on, but not as swiftly and not as deeply as one would like. In order for our society to have a sober impression of military reform problems, it is useful to have an impression of world experience in armed forces reforms. By the way, one should not forget that back before Peter the Great a great deal was undertaken for army reform by Ivan the Terrible and Prince Vasily Golitsin. In the 18th century probably our most important military reformer after Peter was Prince Potemkin-Tavricheskiy. Victories on the battlefield did not fall to his lot as they did to Rumyantsev, Suvorov and Ushakov, but the latter are largely obligated to Potemkin for their successes, which brought fame to the Russian Army and Navy. To this day our Armed Forces largely live under Milyutin's reforms of the 1860's and 1870's. He conducted his reform for almost 20 years, but it just was not completed for a number of reasons. Evidently this had an effect on our defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. It took the Americans at least ten years before they achieved real results in the new armed forces manpower acquisition system.

One must not be hasty, but one also must not delay, otherwise this can be very costly for the country's real security. History has set aside for us a certain time for reform, but do not think it is endless. The most serious problem of progressing in the matter of reforms is financial. An abundance of funds for defense does not stimulate reform, but also their very acute shortage which we experience today binds your forward progress in reforming the Armed Forces. In general I would like to emphasize that Armed Forces reform is not just a job for the Ministry of Defense, it is a statewide task.

[Yakovlev] How do you see the main directions of military reform?

[Kokoshin] It is possible to determine five main components present in a long-range Armed Forces reform policy.

The **first** is a change in the manpower acquisition system. A phased transition to a contract system became one of the main elements of the present Armed Forces organizational development. It is not enough that we have around 200,000 contracts with privates and NCO's; for the time being many servicemen recruited under contract still do not satisfy us in their quality. The entire officer corps, including senior ranks, went over to the contract principle. This is a phenomenon of great importance. It is another matter that the state is not always capable of fulfilling its obligations to servicemen. All this is very complex and many have not realized the essence of the contract system, but it will make itself known in the next five years. The consciousness of the officer

corps, for which contractual relations are forming with the state, is coming to be more in line with a forming civilian society and a rule-of-law state. In this connection it is exceptionally important that the state carefully fulfill its obligations established by law.

**Second** is a system of military education. We have military academies of a very high level where both military as well as civilian scientists with a world name traditionally work. The attractiveness of these academies for our officers is high, because along with a high level of special training, their level of general educational disciplines also is high. But the situation is different in many higher military schools. Life shows that evidently we should considerably expand the network of cadet, Suvorov and Nakhimov schools, competition for which has become very high. Development of a network of such schools is an important matter for all of society, and not just for the Army and Navy. It helps take many bright, energetic boys off the street. More attention must be given to training junior commanders and shaping a professional layer of sergeants and petty officers in combat units.

The **third** component of reform is a change in the Armed Forces structure and their command and control system. The Russian Ministry of Defense inherited a very complex, largely cumbersome structure and command and control system, but I repeat once more that when the Russian Ministry of Defense began its work there was no desire to change the structure. The demand was not to permit a loss of command and control, for there was a point in time when many became uneasy over the one thought that such a bulky, cumbersome thing, possessing nuclear and chemical weapons and enormous stockpiles of conventional munitions and weapons, would disintegrate or lose its space-time orientation under completely new conditions.

Now it is necessary to begin more radical transformations. Ministry of Defense collegiums regularly discuss questions of how we are to overcome the ossification of structures and get rid of their unjustified duplication. In a number of cases duplication not only is inevitable, but also even useful; it increases system reliability.

Now **fourth**. The system of supplying the Army is a direct derivative from the country's economic system. In previous times an extremely centralized system functioned: conditionally speaking, products might be sent from the Far East to Ukraine via Moscow District depots and vice versa. In the last two years we succeeded in changing much here and optimizing the ratio between central procurements and what is done by military districts, fleets, air armies, air defense armies and the Strategic Missile Troops. But the main work still lies ahead. A new, less centralized system of deliveries requires intensifying control over the expenditure of funds and accounting for regional features of price formation on goods and services consumed by the Army and Navy.

Now the Army and Navy are being integrated into the system of a forming market economy, with all accompanying pluses and minuses. This largely also is the source of the corruption with which society is stricken today: new opportunities and temptations appeared for such corruption.

**Fifth** and finally, Armed Forces relations with industry. Previously nine industrial ministries, special Gosplan subunits, and the USSR Council of Ministers Commission for Military-Industrial Matters, not to mention corresponding subunits of the CPSU Central Committee, functioned between the Army and the industrial enterprises proper. It would happen that such a system would impose on the Armed Forces that which they did not need, but on the other hand, Armed Forces representatives would be included in lists of state prize laureates and heroes of socialist labor. Expensive systems would be turned over unfinished, and the infrastructure would develop with a conscious lag. For example, after the cruiser Kirov was accepted she required several more years of completion to become combat effective, and it was also the very same with several types of aircraft.

Now we are moving toward relations with industry that are accepted in all civilized countries. More and more, enterprises of all forms of ownership deal directly with the general client from among Ministry of Defense subunits. Far from everything is well in these relations. They also need a strengthening of economic analysis and of control, including supradepartmental control. The incompleteness of structural transformations in industry remains a problem for us. Design bureaus and series plants in many sectors are separated, as they were before. It happens where series aircraft plants and design bureaus act as competitors in world markets. Potential customers of Russian defense products frequently just do not know with whom to deal. The process of reunification of plants and design bureaus was a component part of the process of forming financial-industrial groups supporting interests of Russia's national industry.

We have to organize the establishment of financial-industrial groups, which will permit bringing in nonstate financial resources for the development we need so much and lighten the load on budgets.

**[Yakovlev]** It is the very time to talk about conversion. If one were to compile a Russian dictionary of words being used endlessly and generally meaning nothing, conversion would occupy its place there.

**[Kokoshin]** Without a doubt. For a long time I have been speaking in favor of getting away from this disorienting term. We must speak above all about a diversification of defense enterprises. In the majority of cases they make up the most valuable part of our industrial and scientific-industrial potential and are almost the main resource for our competitiveness in world markets if we do not wish to turn into a raw-material periphery of the world economy. Many specialists here and abroad repeatedly

have emphasized that it is impossible to convert defense complexes on a "purely market basis." After the war many pure defense plants in the United States were simply closed. That proved more profitable. But this was possible only with high labor force mobility in the United States, with a general rapid growth in the civilian economy, with a developed system of social insurance which appeared within the framework of Roosevelt's "New Deal," and so on.

We have a society of a different nature and a different economy. We have at least 70 cities with the entire social sphere that are almost totally dependent on defense industries. This is a very major problem, both social and economic, which is being resolved very slowly.

An important transformation of relationships between defense and civilian technologies occurred in many countries. For many decades defense technologies significantly outstripped civilian technologies. Defense industry achievements were used aggressively in the West for producing science-intensive civilian products. This was done by one and the same companies, which were equally interested both in a profitable military order and in large civilian sales in the world market. As a result, in America and other developed countries, especially Japan, civilian technologies began to move ahead in a number of cases. Major state infusions through the defense budget and purposeful efforts to commercialize these technologies bore their fruit. To this day, however, the military sector of our economy is enormously stronger technologically than the civilian sector. But a purposeful national industrial policy is required for this.

With a rigid system of centralized planning, the old conversion policy as it took shape toward the end of the 1980's still had certain chances for success with us. Defense plants and design bureaus were charged with producing food industry equipment, medical gear, household electronics and so on. All these assignments functioned in the system of prices and demand which had taken shape at that time. Many were diligently fulfilled, albeit at a high price. In the presence of a general decline in production the output of conversion commodities—refrigerators, television sets, stereo tape recorders and so on—grew considerably in 1991. But a great redistribution of prices set in here. Production costs changed sharply as a reaction to prices on original materials and set-completing materials, which had been artificially undercharged for decades. The jump in prices in the defense sector both on military as well as civilian products turned out to be largely more significant than was the case in the production of civilian products. Previously the defense ruble was considerably heavier than the ruble in civilian machine building, for example. Thus, the defense ruble was 8-10 times more expensive than the dollar in the production of tanks and combat aircraft. Many enterprises adapted to the change in prices and some even increased the production of household appliances. But now these commodities pile up

more and more in warehouses: there was a sharp drop in consumer demand. It also affected orders placed by the state. A shortage of various means of transportation and of communications and television equipment is felt acutely in Russia, but finished aircraft, ships, locomotives and satellites are standing in our plants and yards. In the most developed market economy the state must invest money in transportation, communications and power engineering as well as education, science and culture, even at the expense of increasing the budget deficit. By the way, many authoritative economists believe that a budget deficit is not the chief inflationary factor under certain conditions. With proper organization of the matter such investments will result in lower tariffs for the consumer. A state's investments in the infrastructure are not subsidies for unprofitable enterprises. This is money which later will begin to work and will return to the treasury in a few years. Storage tanks have value, a road has value, and a communications satellite has value. By developing the infrastructure a state thereby stimulates creation of a market.

**[Yakovlev]** Let us end our conversation on a fashionable subject—the army and politics. Conversations to the effect that the army always must be outside of politics remind me of discourse about an independent press. There can be neither in an ideal form.

**[Kokoshin]** The army is a tool of politics, but politics of the state, inasmuch as the army is a state institution. For centuries the army was used in various countries for operations within the country, but in time functions of the army and the police were separated more and more and they basically began handling different missions and affairs. Especially now, when the army has become such a colossal force that any bodily movement has become very noticeable. The army's entire ideology is aimed above all at repelling outside aggression. Nevertheless, I can recall a number of instances where under extreme conditions even in the most developed states the army was used to stop disorders in time, when other force elements no longer had the strength.

In recent years, attempts unfortunately have been made by different political forces to appeal to the Army in an attempt to pull it over to a particular side. This is a very dangerous activity. The Army is a relatively rigid, largely conservative institution: it must be the embodiment of stability both for itself and for public opinion. There has to be a precise line of subordination in the Army, it has to know precisely whom to obey. This is a demand of the nature of armed forces themselves. Therefore the Army actively voted to adopt the new Constitution, specifically because of a thirst for order, organization and preciseness of relations in the state mechanism based on law.

**[Yakovlev]** I understand the meaning of subordination; still, in August 1991 in my view the Army did not proceed from the basis of regulations, but out of civilian considerations.

**[Kokoshin]** The spirit of new times unquestionably has penetrated into the Army. Civilian principles unquestionably penetrated into the Army, but they do not contradict the spirit of subordination and of Army discipline, and, I repeat once more, based on the Constitution and on law. A feeling for law and order is penetrating deeper and deeper into our Armed Forces, and the Ministry of Defense leadership is doing everything possible for this.

**[Yakovlev]** Many pages in the president's last book are devoted to events of 3-4 October. And everything that was said seemingly is incomplete concerning the behavior of the Army and especially of the Minister of Defense in the tragic hours; the author does not give an evaluation or simply an answer as to why.

Remember the lines about how Moscow was defenseless on that night. "And the Army had two and one-half million persons, but not even a thousand fighting men, at least one regiment, could be found to show up now in Moscow and act in defense of the city" (p 383). But what in fact occurred in Grachev's office in the Ministry of Defense? Why could he do nothing for a long time? Finally, why did he not dare undertake something without having received written instructions from the president? Did he wish to secure himself or to have a document for exerting pressure on his subordinates?

**[Kokoshin]** I believe that each person, no matter his position or his rank, has the right to reflect and to assess the situation, especially when it is a question of the lives of hundreds and thousands of people. I can only say that this was a difficult moment for Grachev from a human standpoint, as it also was, by the way, for many others. I am convinced that he attempted to minimize bloodshed.

**[Yakovlev]** Tell me, we do not know a great deal about what occurred in the Army from 3 to 4 October?

**[Kokoshin]** It seems to me the main things are known to the public.

**[Yakovlev]** I am not speaking about you and those around you. I have in mind myself, other people, and society as a whole.

**[Kokoshin]** It stands to reason that there are those moments which particular participants of the given events are in no hurry to share for now, just as they still have not shared the events of August 1991 or the Tbilisi or Vilnius events. To this day we also do not have an exhaustive history, official or unofficial, of the Afghan War. And there is no denying that much still is unclear about the history of the Great Patriotic War.

**[Yakovlev]** In other words, you wish to say that we know just as little about events of 3-4 October as we do about the Afghan War?

**[Kokoshin]** You still have not interpreted me correctly. The events of 3-4 October are considerably more known and obvious. They were made such, including by the mass media.

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### **Military Medical Chief on Recruitment Policy**

94UM0498A Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Jun 94 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Yuriy Nikolayevich Savvin, deputy chief of Main Military Medical Directorate, doctor of medical sciences, by Viktor Badurkin, date, place and occasion not specified: "Will the Sick Be Taken Into the Army?: This Question Naturally Generates Especially Acute Alarm in Parents of Draftees"]

[Text] **Agitated parents phone the editors: "Is it true that sick boys now will taken into the Army?"** The statement by Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev at a ministry collegium that we have very great medical restrictions on draftees' health and that it is necessary "to examine this question" generated serious alarm in this connection. Anxious mothers and fathers naturally want to know what awaits their sons! We asked Lieutenant General Yuriy Savvin, deputy chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate, to explain the situation.

[Savvin] Right off I wish to reassure parents that no serious changes are expected in existing standards. It is a question of unifying two orders presently in force into a single document, a government decree. Leniency toward state of health has been "laid down" in its draft only for vision—from minus six to minus eight diopters, as for the Americans. All other requirements remain rather rigid. Moreover, I would say they are the most rigid among foreign armies.

[Badurkin] **Still, sick boys are ending up in the Army. Why?**

[Savvin] The main reason lies in poor work by local military medical boards. Private Igor Sukhanov now lies in the Hospital imeni Vishnevskiy. He was called up from the city of Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast. After a month of service it was learned that the soldier has congenital heart disease. I would like to look into the eyes of the physician who allowed him to serve. And there are many such persons. Last fall we were forced to return 1,800 sick soldiers to their homes.

Can you imagine what their mothers went through? I am not even talking about our troubles and expenses.

We are not interested in having sick draftees end up in the Army. Therefore now we are setting up authorized military medical boards made up of our physicians under kray and republic military commissariats. They are the ones who will give consultation to and inspect rayon military medical boards. In addition, similar structures already have begun operating in military districts. Such a triple "sieve" already permitted reducing the number of sick draftees ending up in units by 2.5 times.

[Badurkin] **I think that responsibility also should not be removed from the military commissariats attempting to fulfill the plan for the draft at any cost...**

[Savvin] Without question. Rather often we have to "clarify relations" with military commissariats which attempt to justify flaws in their work as being the exactingness of military medical personnel. Although, to be frank, I do not envy them. It is becoming a case where there is no one to draft. I do not wish to touch on legislative problems; I will touch only on medical aspects.

The health and gene pool of the nation are in more than a critical state. Judge for yourself: in five years in Russia the number of sick draftees subject to being released from service doubled and those with diseases of the nervous system, surgical pathology, and skin diseases tripled.

The fact that today we release every fourth draftee from service for state of health and five percent have received deferments eloquently indicates the state of our public health. That is the first time in my memory. Even according to official data, 53 percent of schoolchildren have weakened health and 75-80 percent of our children become ill by final exams. Long-running illnesses are observed in a third of juveniles, especially in higher classes, and morphologic or functional deviations in two thirds. By the end of schooling the number of schoolchildren with chronic pathology increases by one and a half times, and it forms for every other person as a result of poor medical supervision and medical sanitation. Now every third draftee has insufficient intellectual development and 40 percent are not physically fit, to put it mildly.

I do not know how these figures affect the lawmakers and government, but they frighten me, a medical man. A state medical program is needed urgently before everything is lost.

[Badurkin] **But the fact is, heavy stresses, both physical and psychological, await these boys in the Army. Do you help them in some way?**

[Savvin] Yes, the Army is an area of heightened risk and serious stresses. Not everyone is up to this, especially now, when troops are at half strength and one has to serve for yourself and that other lad, as they say. Therefore we try to do everything possible to maintain and even strengthen the soldiers' health. They undergo a medical examination twice a year. We provide treatment and medicine to all who need it.

Recently a new problem appeared for us—new recruits coming into the troops with body weight deficiency. Last year there were more than 4,500 such boys. A supplementary diet of one and a half rations is prescribed for them. Unfortunately, this food often does not reach the soldiers. It is not so simple to eradicate the notorious dedovshchina and the irresponsibility of some commanders, but this is not a matter for medical personnel.

[Badurkin] **But it is for these reasons that thousands of soldiers die in the Army each year; I am not speaking of those discharged for state of health.**



[Savvin] Alas, loss statistics are "classified," as is the number of those "boarded." I do not have the right to give a specific figure. I can say only that last year several tens of thousands were discharged from the Army for state of health, but that is together with officers, warrant officers and those wounded in "hot" spots. It also includes those who received ordinary, everyday injuries. In addition, there also are occult and purely age-related genetic diseases. For example, it is often asserted that soldiers die in the Army from acute leukosis, which means they are irradiated, although specialists know that in the majority of cases this disease is transmitted by heredity and appears specifically at draft age. Not any more soldiers suffer from acute leukosis than their contemporaries in civilian life.

[Badurkin] By the way, about treatment. Yuri Nikolayevich, mothers often complain that it is difficult for a soldier to get into a hospital.

[Savvin] One has to look into each such case specifically. Of course, there are violations and mistakes, but with respect to our capabilities, we are practically fully supplied with hospitals. Depending on the illness, our soldiers are treated in garrison, base, district or central hospitals without any kind of restrictions. Take our Main Hospital imeni Burdenko, for example. Every fourth patient there is from the troops, districts and fleets. All receive the most skilled assistance.

Outbreaks of "children's" diseases—scarlet fever, measles, diphtheria—have become more frequent in the Army now, as they have throughout the country. Therefore we inoculate everyone without exception. And we have gotten by without tragedies; there have been only a few cases of a light form of measles.

[Badurkin] Speaking of mass illnesses, it is impossible not to recall events on Russkiy Island...

[Savvin] Military medical personnel long ago sounded the alarm, predicting a tragedy, but we were not heeded in time. The fact is, the situation is difficult and dangerous not just on this island, but also in many Far Eastern garrisons and even such large ones as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Flooded basements, unsanitary conditions in messhalls, baths and laundries...

Military medical personnel warn the corresponding commanders about each such instance, and when the latter do not react we turn to the procuracy. Last year 132 criminal cases were instituted based on our materials; true, no reaction at all followed in 51 instances. But we insist and will continue to insist on our requirements, because the main thing for us is the health of officers and men.

## STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

### Scientist on Nuclear Weapons Development Programs

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in Russian 1 Jul 94 p 5

[Interview with Radiy Ivanovich Ilkayev, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences and first deputy scientific

adviser of Arzamas-16 Federal Nuclear Center, by Vladimir Gubarev, Nekos Studio: "Singed by the Nuclear Flame"; date and place not given]

[Text] During Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Arzamas-16, a rather harsh discussion took place between him and the scientists. And, first and foremost, about the incompetence of certain Russian leaders who constantly talk about nuclear disarmament, sometimes having a highly vague and distorted notion of atomic weapons. Yeltsin agreed that he needs an adviser on the nuclear complex. Named among the first ones recommended at Arzamas-16 was Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Radiy Ivanovich Ilkayev. He is the very one who acquainted the president with the institute and was a unique tour guide around the museum where the nuclear munitions developed at Arzamas-16 are exhibited.

[Gubarev] Just what are nuclear weapons? What do you think about them as a designer and as a person who developed them with his own hands?

[Ilkayev] Our attitude toward them is complicated and, I would say, profound. As you very well understand, we are state people and we have always solved state problems and this is why we have this kind of attitude. This is our philosophy.

[Gubarev] Is the scope of your thinking like this?

[Ilkayev] Of course. Our philosophy is quite defined because it is impossible in principle to deal with items which are so terrible and which represent a colossal potential danger and not to have a corresponding philosophy. First-class, good specialists cannot work only because of wages, the best living conditions and the like.

We need to be convinced that our country—formerly the Soviet Union and now Russia—should have a strong defense. This is unambiguous since, without a strong defense, Russia will not exist as an integral state. And we believe that, without nuclear weapons, it is impossible to protect such an enormous country.

[Gubarev] In my opinion, this is a very clear-cut position.

[Ilkayev] I agree. This is why we react, negatively at times, to those unprofessional statements which appear in the press. There is a long chain: the state, the people, defense, the necessity of nuclear weapons, their production, testing, reduction and so on. In general, a quite complicated hierarchy and a unique technological structure. And when one link or part, sometimes a very minute one, breaks away from it completely arbitrarily and a so-called "broad public discussion" begins around it, this does not please us and we would prefer a different approach.

[Gubarev] Perhaps, it would make sense to illustrate this thesis with a specific example?

[Ilkayev] Let us take nuclear tests. Necessary or not, just how much do they harm the ecology and to what extent?

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Undoubtedly, these problems need to be discussed, but preferably in a general context. It must be understood: if you stop the tests, this is a very inexpensive way to inflict colossal losses on the defense nuclear complex. Then it is necessary to act in a normal fashion: to make a decision about the fact that, in 20 years, our nuclear weapons will be destroyed and stopping the tests is the first step in this direction. Then everything is clear.

Unfortunately, there is no such clarity today. On the one hand, we assert: yes, nuclear weapons are needed for defense but, on the other hand, we are stopping the tests. The lack of an exclusive and integrated examination of the problem, of course, does not please us and is causing a protest. We know very well that a deformation in one part inevitably expands to the entire structure, in this instance, to Russia's defense policy.

Now, about the weapons themselves. There is, undoubtedly, an enormous cost—intellectual and, of course, material. The nuclear complexes are gigantic enterprises and there are enormous material resources. The people have spent a pretty penny on the development of the nuclear industry.

[Gubarev] There has been talk about nuclear terrorism, about the seizure of weapons and about their sale. How do you appraise the danger?

[Ilkayev] We, the developers and the specialists, need to remember this all the time. Previously, we concerned ourselves little about this, inasmuch as we believed that there are and would not be terrorists in the Soviet Union. But the scientists and politicians erred. Of course, no one expected that a situation like we have today would arise. And, even though the weapons are being shipped to Russia and, it would seem, security is increasing, all the same, we should consider the new situation. And we must devise a distinctive "defense against terrorism." This requires both organizational measures and technical ones.

[Gubarev] But the public has a right to know the situation with respect to nuclear weapons! We remember that the secrecy with respect to the operation of nuclear power plants led to Chernobyl. In my opinion, public monitoring only helps the physicists, as strange as this may sound. It increases the degree of responsibility. And, after all, the weapons and nuclear power plants are unique twin brothers, they have a common history, the one and the same parents and, finally, the same danger—radioactivity.

[Ilkayev] It is necessary to maintain a very clear-cut boundary—not to permit the use of nuclear physics in a way harmful to man. On the one hand, the people should know as much as possible, but, on the other hand, they should not permit the use of nuclear weapons as a means for terrorism, blackmail and imperial ambitions, as well as make them safe to the fullest extent.

Undoubtedly, the secrecy is a hinderance to some extent, but at the same time, it also makes it possible to

maintain stability. However, the main thing is that it is necessary to trust those people who develop the weapons. Their competence, their concern for the fate of the world and their conscience and honesty. The people trusted us and believed in our ability not only to develop such terrible weapons, but also to exercise control over them. In my opinion, we have, as of yet, never abused this trust.

It was on this optimistic note that our first talk with Radiy Ivanovich Ilkayev ended. But a new meeting took place not long before the "shooting" of the White House in Moscow, when the Supreme Soviet cut short its own existence. In the summer of 1993, a catastrophic situation arose at Russia's federal nuclear centers. The weapons developers did not receive any money and, in point of fact, the funding of the nuclear weapons complex had been cut off.... Both centers' collectives began to talk about a "strike," although no one had any idea how it should proceed....

During this alarming time, Belugin, Ilkayev, Voronin and representatives from Chelyabinsk-70 went to Moscow. They met with the leaders of the committees of Russia's Supreme Soviet, in order to tell them about the situation in the closed cities. Radiy Ivanovich Ilkayev had already been appointed first deputy scientific adviser of VNIIEF [All-Union Experimental Physics Scientific Research Institute]. Our discussion was continued.... But quite recently, on the anniversary of Yu. B. Khariton, we finished our talk. It turned out that it had continued for 2 years....

[Gubarev] Is the situation really so critical that a strike is necessary?

[Ilkayev] Imagine this situation: a scientific worker is conducting research in the interests of the country's defense. He receives such-and-such wages. And, at the same time, the state hires a person who guards this scientific worker, so that secrets do not wander off anywhere. Today, the scientific worker is receiving several times less than the person who is guarding him. An absurd situation, is it not?

Of course, as the administrators of the nuclear centers, we are responsible both for weapons development and for their safety and for ensuring that nuclear technologies do not spread across the planet. But when hundreds of people up to 40 years of age begin to quit, to leave and to go into other structures, it is simply impossible to keep track of them. A very serious problem arises with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It seems to me that we are underrating the situation which is arising. The talks on non-proliferation are becoming utopian.

Nearly all the well-known scientists associated in one way or another with nuclear physics have worked at Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. They laid the foundation for an essentially new scientific school. It is unique both for science and for public life because nowhere, even in the sternest years, had there been such freedom and audacity

of expression on all political matters. And, as strange as it seems, the country's leadership looked at all this calmly because what was required of us, first of all, was the development of specific nuclear devices and nuclear munitions which would be in no way inferior to the American ones. And this is how it was with the hydrogen bomb.

But then began unilateral moratoria and we could not perform that task which had been set in recent years—sharply enhancing the safety of our weapons. It is needed not in order to increase the combat qualities of the weapons, but rather, first of all, to enhance reliability in their use, transportation and servicing, i.e., for safety in our everyday life. But, I reiterate, because of the unilateral moratoria, which had become the subject of political games, we lagged behind the Americans in this area.

Now, about the other direction of the work. The functioning of a nuclear center in any country is impossible without basic and applied physical research and, usually, this is work on a world-class level. Otherwise, a federal center is converted into an ordinary office which is not capable of delivering the most advanced technology and the most advanced designs.

And we were always concerned about our scientific unit being maintained in good condition. And it is very, very grave at both federal centers. We have the world's largest nuclear reactors, excellent laser devices and test beds—in general, a serious technical base. If it is undermined, and this, unfortunately, is happening, then it will be simply impossible to maintain modern nuclear weapons at an adequately high level.

[Gubarev] Without basic research, you will simply perish?

[Ilkayev] Of course. Unfortunately, the present times are seriously undermining our basic science. It requires funds, and quite a few, which is perfectly natural. But they are not being allocated. I repeat once again: our special features are such that, without research, it is impossible to deal not only with the improvement of the weapons, but also even with their destruction. Just as there cannot be a house without a foundation, so is our work unthinkable without the constant conducting of research.

The problem is being aggravated by the fact that our customer, strictly speaking, can be no one other than the state—no enterprise, no kolkhoz and not even the largest firm. This is why we are engaged in specific and very large programs. The center alone may be used for the solving of such large problems. It is also possible to handle, in a trivial way, conversion problems, but then the potential will be dispersed rapidly and no kind of result can be expected.

The point is that our intellectual capabilities, scientific developments and technical base should be used in accordance with established traditions and control structures. The federal center was established in order to

handle large programs: very science-intensive, very labor-intensive and very complicated ones. So let the center be used as intended! All the same, there are no similar forces in Russia, which are capable of doing what we can do.

[Gubarev] But do you have specific proposals?

[Ilkayev] Of course. In the next few years, the energy problem will become very acute for Russia. We propose that, together with the leading domestic institutes, we develop a national program for the development of the power engineering of the future, a program aimed at the development of safer technologies. We already have interesting ideas and this is precisely the kind of task which matches our potential and our capabilities. And really, does Russia not need safe power engineering?

We have large national-level programs for enhancing the nuclear power plants' safety. The problem is a pressing one for the entire world as well.

Of course, we have nothing against specific steps for conversion. We have a mass of technologies which can serve as the basis for the production of quite specific types of equipment: for medical, industrial and agricultural purposes. And we are already making such instruments and signing contracts. In my opinion, 15 percent of the institute's capacities can work on conversion, 50 percent can satisfy military needs and 40 percent can be used for basic research.

But there is one cardinal requirement which everyone should understand. Conversion, basic science and the work on military items require a state approach and serious state support. But we are not seeing this for the time being.

## NAVAL FORCES

### Participants Assess Baltops Exercise

PM0707140994 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 5 Jul 94 p 2

[Report by Captain First Class Valeriy Gromak: "Seventh Position—in the Line of the Ships Participating in the Baltops '94 NATO Exercises It Proved Lucky for the Russian Escort Ship Neustrashimyy"]

[Text] Peter I chose the right people to teach him about sailing. You can see that for yourself even these days. This thought came to mind more than once as I watched the skillful actions of the crew of the small Dutch launch which delivered me through a storm onto the Dutch guided missile frigate Kortenaer, and then watching the actions of the frigate's sailors. Particularly when Commander (captain 2d class) Bruin allowed me to visit virtually all the combat positions. Two years ago on board the Dutch frigate Bloys van Treslong I was only allowed to cross the threshold of the central command post: "Sorry, no further." But now Commander Bruin has quite a different view: "If we want to trust each other, we should have as few secrets as possible."

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But even the Russians are not that naive. In the first phase of the "Baltops '94" exercises, which are being held for the 23d time in the region of the Baltic straits, the ship flying the flag of St. Andrew was given seventh position in the line. The Neustrashimyy is the second Russian ship to take part in these NATO exercises. Last year the crew of the escort ship Bditelnyy were also given seventh position, which turned out to be "lucky." Number seven also brought good luck to the Neustrashimyy in these exercises.

But, whereas last year our escort ship played a secondary part, which it handled successfully, this year number seven was a substantial step forward for the Neustrashimyy. After all, a year ago there were 11 ships rehearsing their missions at sea, this year there are more than 40. The number of participating countries with an interest in the safety of shipping in the Baltic has expanded as well.

The Russian sailors took part in tracking airborne targets, where the group's air-defense center was the American guided missile cruiser Gettysburg, and rehearsed elements of a towing exercise and ship-to-ship transfers of men and cargo. An American sabotage squad duplicating likely enemy operations parachuted onto the Neustrashimyy from a C-130 aircraft. The only area where the ship could not participate was target practice—the ship's ammunition stores contained only live shells.

Subsequently, at the German Navy's main base at Kiel and in the Polish port of Gdynia Swedish Defense Minister Anders Bjorck; Admiral Sten Swedlund, commander of the Swedish Navy; and Rear Admiral Hans Lyussov [surname as transliterated], chief of staff of the German Navy, not only admitted that it was the first time they had been aboard a Russian ship at sea, but also made their own assessments of what they had seen.

"To my mind, Russian naval seamen should make their contribution to strengthening stability in the Baltic region," Anders Bjorck noted, for instance. "We need to create a situation in which our countries can live in prosperity, for many important trade routes have run through this area since time immemorial, and the region is unique from the geopolitical standpoint."

"It was very important for me to visit your ship. You sail superbly and you are excellent hosts as well," Adm. Lyussov told your correspondent. "I was also the first German naval officer to fly over the sea in a Russian military helicopter and to see from above how the missions were carried out. So I confirm yet again my excellent assessment."

This was not the only assessment of the actions of the Baltic Fleet airmen, who are only beginning after a long interval to learn how to land on deck. During the exercises the crews led by Lieutenant Colonels Aleksandr Zherebtsov and Aleksandr Petrov constantly demonstrated their high level of training. The landing made by a Russian helicopter on the deck of the Hayler, a USN guided missile destroyer, even delighted the American professionals.

The five-day exercises, full of real combat training, flew by.

"Over the past few days our ship has been very popular," Captain 2d Class Igor Ryzhkov, commander of the Neustrashimyy, believes, "and the exercises themselves have been a good schooling for the crew."

In other words, they measured themselves against others and proved their worth. Above all, they started operating on an equal footing in the—for them—new job of cooperating with the NATO navies. It is gratifying that this year the NATO leaders who planned the exercises saw the Russian seamen as equals. "People's diplomacy" also worked to a certain extent. During the parade of ships, for instance, the organizers of the exercises—the Americans—were more restrained than they had been a year ago, when they hoisted a huge, 20-30-meter American flag over their ship. In order, apparently, to let everyone see who is in charge in the Baltic.

Although the "Baltops '94" exercises were staged and financed by the United States this time too, the U.S. sailors did not "thumb their noses" any more at their colleagues from other countries. Exercise leader Captain Edward Hunter, commander of the U.S. Navy's 14th Squadron, noted that the spending on these exercises will be recouped in the shape of the observance of U.S. national interests: "If there is peace and stability in Europe, that will benefit the United States too."

On the whole, however, it is my view that the exercises, in which ships of countries that do not belong to the NATO bloc are participating, are, rather, a political action aimed at expanding contacts, allowing sailors to get acquainted, and creating an atmosphere of trust and respectfulness among peoples. If exercises in the Baltic continue to be organized not on the bloc principle but on the regional principle, then the need for Russia's participation and its role in such maneuvers will increase, and U.S. mediation with attempts to impose its own view of the world will give way to equitable cooperation.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY FORCES

### Problems for Russian Units Protecting Turkmenistan Border

94UM049. A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jul 94 p 5

[Article from Ashkhabad by Vladimir Kuleshov, IZVESTIYA: "The Russian Military in Turkmenia: Moscow Is to the Rear, But There Is Nothing To Fall Back On"]

[Text] "...We were told: your experience and knowledge are needed here for organizational development of the Republic Armed Forces and for Russia's fulfillment of treaty obligations. But today, totally deprived of an opportunity to realize our specialized skills, we feel only that we are unneeded and unclaimed..."

These are lines from a letter delivered to the IZVESTIYA correspondents' post a month after the departure from Ashkhabad of a special Russian Federation Ministry of Defense commission which was checking the validity of an article in the newspaper entitled "Russian Officers in Turkmenistan Intend To Complain to the United Nations." The people who signed it have grounds for this.

They did not try to avoid the problems in the headquarters of the operations group of Russian troops in Turkmenistan:

"There are many resentments, and the majority are just. Yes, tanks stand around without spare parts and storage batteries, aircraft and helicopters are not flying, nothing has been done despite repeated directives of President S. Niyazov for an exchange of currency for Russian servicemen, and there is a lack of Turkmen officers in the national Armed Forces. But it is impossible to leave here. A wave of criminal acts, terrorism and drugs is pouring into Russia and countries of the Commonwealth, for borders here are transparent."

"If border security by Russian lads departs this life," I recall the words of N. Reznichenko, chief of the Takhta-Bazar detachment, "Turkmenia may cease to exist as an independent state..."

That was said exactly two years ago, in times not yet so excessive, when there was light and water at all zastavas [border outposts] of Turkmenia, necessary means of signaling and communications functioned and there were no systematically insolent violations such as today.

Border guard personnel are detaining illegal border crossers no longer in the dozens, as before, but in the hundreds. They come here from Iran and Afghanistan. Some carry weapons, others drugs, and still others drag bags of dollars and gold and silver articles. But a new breed of violators has appeared, the operatives told us: an affiliation with special agencies has been noted in the behavior of certain Afghan and Iranian citizens. They

display an interest in Border Guard Troops subunits and servicemen and attempt to draw Turkmen border guards into illegal activity. More and more often, officers involved in operations register examples of illegal contacts by local border guards with civilians of contiguous states on a smuggling basis.

But if "there is nothing to fall back on," in that case who will finance Russian troops in Turkmenistan? How much money (no, not in manats and not even in rubles, which change their rate each day, but in dollars) is provided for in the budget of Turkmenistan and Russia for upkeep of borders? And if such calculations have been made, then it would be interesting to learn whether or not they are included in the budget. Such questions would not arise if it were possible to receive a specific answer to them in conversations with representatives of the military-political leadership of Turkmenia and of the Russian command element.

"No, we do not know. We are not in the picture," is what one has occasion to hear from those who head up the Army of Turkmenistan and Russian troops here.

Just how is the border to be secured? How are we to fight if, God forbid, it becomes necessary, when alert duty and combat training in fact have been stopped in units of the Air Force, Air Defense, Navy and Signal Troops, and when aircraft, tanks, helicopters and APC's stand around without necessary spare parts, storage batteries, POL and attendant specialists? A large portion of them is just begging to be recycled, since it is ownerless. But the fact is, two or three years ago all this was in complete combat readiness, as were the training fields, ranges and the airfield network. Today they are completely idle.

"Tanks, guns and aircraft can wait," I was told by officers of Military Unit 61413 in Kyzyl-Arvat. "There are larger problems."

The problems are ammunition dumps plunked down on and under the ground in abundance in Turkmenia, near cities and within cities; dumps for all kinds of ammunition, ammunition for arms which do not and never did exist in Turkmenistan and long ago requiring urgent inspection and precautions, not to mention security.

Around 5,000 carloads of stores of artillery armament, a great portion of which needs urgent monitoring, have piled up in military depots of Turkmenia today. Should something happen, it would go off with such a bang that the explosion near Vladivostok would seem to be a child's prank. I believe this, since I myself saw a train with large-caliber projectiles disappear into the gaping mouth of one such storage area near Bezmein.

Meanwhile, it is not such a difficult task to penetrate into that same depot. Just four years ago I had occasion to tell in IZVESTIYA about young boys who were making their way freely into one of these depots. In attempting to determine the location of assault rifles, grenades and cartridges, they were lighting their way with home-made

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torches. When they were finally caught after the third or fourth trip, the lieutenant colonel who took part in the investigation let drop to me: "Generally we were all lucky, but especially the city of Bezmein."

I recall there was a lot of noise and at that time serious strictness was imposed in installation security, but I repeat that this happened four years ago. Today no one is worried: just think, they took 5-6 assault rifles and a box of grenades—with luck they will be found...

Who will guarantee that misfortune will not occur if the total irresponsibility of soldiers not trained to discipline, who look on service in the Army as an obligation and not military duty, also is mixed in with an acute personnel shortage?

"Desertion has become the norm," I heard from officers. "The number of deserters has gone over 5,000 just for the Republic Armed Forces. It happens where there is no one but an officer to assign to a [sentry] post..."

"When we came here," they say, "we thought we were needed here for Russia's strategic interests in Central Asia and were confident that the Motherland would not forget us. But today we are convinced of the opposite: there are no conditions in Turkmenia for our service. Pay in Turkmen manats is \$8-12 per month according to the actual rate. There are no food rations or annual one-time allowances and also no opportunity to sell, exchange or lease your privatized apartment. Are we really not needed by anyone?"

Recently there was a fight in one sector of a border zastava of the Takhta-Bazar detachment. "The zastava," said the official report, "was alerted and border guard personnel set out for the site of the violation, when bursts of automatic fire from assault rifles rang out against them from a small hill in the rear."

"During the battle Private 1st Class Sh. Shadurdyev received a perforating bullet wound, but the violators did not succeed in carrying out a major smuggling deal..."

There was not a word in the report about the fact that after the battle two Turkmen border guard personnel departed for Afghanistan together with the Mujahideen. They departed on their own...

One should not be surprised if "happy" Turkmenia soon becomes a second Tajikistan.

## UKRAINE

### Defense-Security Subcommittee Heads Named

94UM0488B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
18 Jun 94 p 1

[Unattributed article—special to NARODNA ARMIYA: "The Commission Is Beginning Its Work"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Council recently created the Commission for Defense and State Security Issues

consisting of 26 people's deputies. Deputy V. Mukhin was elected chairman of the commission.

A meeting of the commission was held at which its structure was determined and the leadership was elected. In terms of its structure the commission consists of five subcommissions:

- for military issues;
- for issues of state security;
- for border and customs duty issues and the National Guard of Ukraine;
- for issues of the military-industrial complex, conversion, and military science;
- for issues of social protection of servicemen.

People's Deputy A. Chykal was elected deputy chairman of the commission and chairman of the subcommission for military issues, and People's Deputy O. Chornousenko—deputy chairman of the commission and chairman of the subcommission for issues of state security.

The following were elected subcommission chairmen:

- for border and customs duty issues and the National Guard of Ukraine—People's Deputy Yu. Kryzskyy;
- for issues of the military-industrial complex, conversion, and military science—B. Kozhevnykov;
- for issues of social protection of servicemen—People's Deputy G. Samofalov.

Priority measures for developing draft legislative acts in the sphere of defense and state security were determined at the meeting of the commissions.

First of all it is envisioned, in keeping with instructions from the Ukrainian Supreme Council, to study jointly with the Commission for Issues of Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety the state of affairs concerning execution of the disarmament agreement with regard to the liquidation of strategic missiles by Ukraine and to submit the conclusions to the parliament for consideration.

### Maj-Gen Martyrosyan Calls for Civilian Defense Minister

94UM0488A Kiev VECHIRNIY KYIV in Ukrainian  
17 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by Major General Vilen Martyrosyan under the rubric "Military Affairs: A Viewpoint": "What Kind of Minister Do We Need: In Uniform or Not?"]

[Text] As a member of the Interregional Group of Deputies which was headed by Academician A. Sakharov, I happened to participate in 1991 in developing an alternative version of the draft military reform. Its primary essence was, first, in codifying effective

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parliamentary control over the Armed Forces and, second, making the administrative staff of the Ministry of Defense less costly.

We assumed that from a military administration organ, the Ministry of Defense should become an organ for military-policy leadership. This would have made it possible to considerably reduce the central staff and secure perceptible financial economies due to staffing the ministry with civilian professions. The funds that used to be received as rank-based pay, privileges, and food rations could have been allocated to carry out social programs.

Our version of military reform assumed that the Ministry of Defense would exercise administrative control over the Armed Forces, carry out military policy, supply the Army with financing, armaments, and materiel, draw up the budget, and implement conversion of the defense industry.

We must say that at present such a model is being developed in Russia and will soon be accepted in its Armed Forces. However, as I see it, the Ukrainian Armed Forces since the moment of their formation have embarked on the path of blindly copying the obsolete structures of the former Soviet Army, which is a dead end. Further militarization of our society continues; a most powerful system of enforcement ministries and departments has been created. At present there is one person in uniform per 25 taxpayers in Ukraine. The actual strength of military formations has remained here at the same level as of the moment of disintegration of the USSR. Are the working people capable of feeding such a number of their defenders?

The experience of modern wars has indicated that a large army does not solve large problems. Therefore, reductions in armed forces are underway in a number of Western countries in combination with their qualitative improvement and the adoption of precision weapons. In the process they first of all want to cut back the administrative structure of the Ministry of Defense and make it less costly and more mobile.

In our country, the process of the restoration of Ministry of Defense leading organs with the former staff organization designed for an army of many millions is picking up steam. This is easy to explain. It is impossible to reduce the army as long as military men who are directly interested in keeping up personnel strength in order to justify the existence of a certain number of generals are leaders of the Ministry of Defense. In turn, civilian officials would have a vested interest in making the Ministry of Defense less costly because ranks are of no interest to them and the size of their salaries does not depend on the number of personnel.

In the United States, England, France, and other developed countries of the world the Ministries of Defense are headed by civilians. This rule ensures effective parliamentary control over the armed forces because the

civilian officials that head military departments are not tied to the interests of supreme army echelons. Thus, in the United States, where not a single military coup has been attempted throughout its history, the general staff is under the dual control of the President and the secretary of defense. As far as the servicemen are concerned, they perform only one function—to serve, getting additional pay for risk and combat readiness.

The presence of a civilian in a leadership position at the Ministry of Defense would make it possible to root out the churlishness which seeps into every crack, career ambitions in the worst meaning of the word, and boorishness. Respectable experienced generals use the choicest foul language in the presence of youthful soldiers and denigrate the dignity of officers in front of the ranks. This may be our woe rather than our fault. Our officers, who have been brought up on the principle "I am the boss, you are the fool," rely on repressive forms of relations with their subordinates rather than on behavior norms accepted in normal societies. I still hope that a civilian minister of defense will be a very cultured person who will lead by example in introducing the spirit of democratism, kindness, and a fatherly attitude toward the soldiers in our military collectives. This may be the first step toward rooting out *dedovshchina* [recruit hazing] which, I am convinced, originates in high offices rather than in barracks.

A civilian minister of defense could take a new look at the procedures that prevail in our army and have become part and parcel of what we do to such a degree that we no longer notice their pernicious influence on the moral climate in collectives.

For example, why should an officer stay in the barracks around the clock? After all, he has a family and children, for whose upbringing he is also responsible to the state. Is this always required by the needs of service, or is this to obscure the inability to organize the actions of subordinates?

I am certain that the minister of defense can and should play an essential role in this. After all, he is the most vivid example for emulation. If nothing else, recall a recent visit of the U.S. secretary of defense to Ukraine, how naturally and amicably our American guest behaved during the negotiations and how straightforward and constrained his Ukrainian colleague was.

A few years ago, a general of the Polish Armed Forces who came to my regiment stated in an unguarded moment that in the Soviet Army he could tell a commander from his subordinates even from a great distance based on the manner of behavior, gesticulation, and even gait. I think that little has changed for the better in our army, either.

Expectations of democratization in the Army will be in vain for as long as the Ministry of Defense is headed by a general. The dictatorship of power is so great and the generals have been steeled in cadre games to such a



degree that all attempts to change are in vain. This system prevents a person from being himself and forces him to give up his principles. Order may be instilled in the Army by dictatorial methods, threats, and churlishness, but this will be a temporary and frail order. In China, they say that "one cannot stand on tiptoes very long." A collective based on such an order will fall apart in the very first trial.

The Ukrainian Supreme Council has already resolved that the minister of defense may be a civilian. This is very correct. I see this as the main step toward effective reform in the Army. It is time to understand that the generals are not interested in either cutbacks in the Army or major reforms. The president should heed the voice of reason—people who are not indifferent to the fate of our Armed Forces.

I am certain that the new membership of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Commission for Defense and State Security Issues will undertake to really carry out military reform without leaving this difficult task solely in the hands of the Ministry of Defense military collegium.

The times call for a minister to come to the Ministry of Defense who is prepared to accept this most difficult mission not for the sake of a higher rank or a leather coat, not for the sake of a ruby star or another rung in his service career. The ability to click one's heels and even combat experience should not be the main criterion in this instance. The Ministry of Defense should be headed by a politician with new thinking who clearly sees the prospects for the organizational development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine under the conditions of a rule-of-law democratic state.

#### **Hudym Stresses Advantages of Education at Military Establishments**

94UM0484 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
9 Jun 94 p 1

[Interview with Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Main Directorate for Military Education Chief Major-General Viktor Mykolayovych Hudym by Lieutenant-Colonel Valeriy Korol under the rubric "Perspective": "Military Education: A Table of Ranks for the Schools, Converted Diplomas for the Graduates"]

[Text] *The question of the further improvement of training of cadres at military educational institutions is a very topical one, since "the cadres resolve everything." What prospects in this area are seen by the chief of the Main Directorate for Military Education of the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine, Major-General Viktor Hudym?*

[Valeriy Korol] Viktor Mykolayovych, rumors have been swirling around the reform of military education for a long time. Many spears have been broken, and many answers have not yet been received. How do you assess the changes that have occurred over the last two years in military education?

[Viktor Hudym] I have become convinced, even over my brief time in my position, that the strategic direction for creating a system of military education has been chosen correctly. Quite a bit has been done over the two years. Serious errors have also been made.

The requirements of the armed forces in some fields were unfortunately not taken into account for a time. The system of military education did not envisage the full coverage of the shortfall of personnel that could take shape in 1997-98. The capacity of some higher educational institutions was not taken into account. The Kiev and Odessa institutes of the ground forces thus ended up "overloaded" with cadets and attendees. The Sevastopol Naval Institute is "underutilized."

The spaces in the military schools, training centers and compounds were allocated to the other ministries and departments in a poorly thought-out manner. At least the most essential—if not all—of them must now be changed.

[Korol] A wave of protests, especially from the local areas, was elicited at one time by the haste with which the military schools were being eliminated. Some of them were unique in their own way, after all. Say, the Zhytomyr Radio Engineering School...

[Hudym] It possessed a strong educational material base, the only one in the former Union.

Today, when the national space program has been adopted and space troops are being created, we have an extreme need for specialists in just that field. We are thus planning to begin training specialists in information processing and flight control of spacecraft, based on the school, starting in the new academic year. The selection for the first year will be this year. The spaces in the second and third years will obviously have to be filled by the transfer of cadets from other higher educational institutions in allied fields to the military-space division.

A new decision is also needed with regard to the Sumy Higher Artillery Command School. The creation of a military-artillery department, with its subsequent conversion into an artillery institute, at Sumy State University is still being planned.

[Korol] Viktor Mykolayovych, the restoration of some of the former educational institutions will nonetheless not provide any opportunity to train armed forces personnel in all of the necessary fields.

[Hudym] I would like to point out that only 55 percent of the required specialists are trained in Ukraine. The training of the personnel who are lacking will be starting from square one. The creation of some new higher educational institutions is thus expected. A military institute for rear support and transport, for example, based on the Dnipropetrovsk VZRKU. The "matériel" people and specialists in food, fuels and lubricants will be trained there. The institute will also obviously have a department for the railway troops.

The military training departments of Kiev and Lviv universities will in the future become military institutes under those universities.

Instructor personnel are being trained, and their periodic retraining is conducted, at a recently created institute for the humanities.

[Korol] The restoration of old higher educational institutions and the creation of new ones can be done by willful decision. But will they be able to train the personnel at the necessary level?

[Hudym] Our higher educational institutions have to pass difficult tests. I have in mind the accreditation of the military educational institutions, which will make it possible to ascertain the true capabilities of each specific higher educational institution. The educational institutions will be ranked at certain levels in accordance with that, from first to fourth.

The first level of accreditation gives the right to train young specialists, the second baccalaureates, the third specialists and, finally, the fourth—masters along with candidates and doctors of sciences.

All of the higher educational institutions will undergo licensing this year (this is the first stage in accreditation and registration in the state register of Ukraine).

The Accreditation Center of the Ministry of Defense is being created by decision of the Intersector Accreditation Commission and the Collegium of the Ministry of Education. The order for it has been signed by the Minister of Defense.

[Korol] Viktor Mykolayovych, will all of the military higher educational institutions be able to attain accreditation? What is your prediction?

[Hudym] One of the primary requirements pertaining to accreditation is the qualitative features of the professors and instructors. A higher educational institution, for example, needs to have no less than 70 percent of the total number of instructors with academic degrees in order to be accredited at level four—that is, to train masters of sciences. That is perhaps the most difficult problem for us.

Only three higher educational institutions today have the possibility of being accredited—the Kharkiv Military University, the Kiev Institute of the Air Forces, and the Military Institute for Command, Control and Communications.

[Korol] But isn't the gap in the time frames for the training of military specialists who are enlisted men, warrant officers or sergeants, at one half to one year, and officers, at 5–6 years, too large?

[Hudym] It only seems that way at first glance. We are planning to revive the intermediate technical training of military specialists; that is 2–3 years. The category of "junior specialist" is also appearing here. They are

trained on the basis of full secondary education. Two problems have yet to be solved for this purpose—the development of the list of positions to which the young specialists may be assigned, and the definition of their service status among the troops: military rank, service under contract, the appropriate remuneration, future prospects in the service, the possibility of continuing their training...

The replacement of some officer positions with warrant officers with a certain level of training is also expected.

[Korol] So what will the size of the system of military education be, in that case?

[Hudym] It will be approximately 12 percent of the size of the armed forces. It should be taken into account, however, that the military higher educational institutions do not train specialists only for the armed forces, but also for the National Guard, the Security Service, the Civil Defense, the State Border Committee and others.

[Korol] The fight to resubordinate the higher educational institutions has been going on for some time. Who will be supervising them now—the educational directorate or the commands of the branches of the armed forces?

[Hudym] The system of military education that is taking shape in Ukraine is fundamentally different from both the traditional system of the former USSR and the contemporary systems that have been adopted in other countries. Almost all of the higher educational institutions in particular cover many fields, and are of an inter-branch nature. They all have structures for post-graduate education—command and staff departments, departments for supervisory engineering personnel—that provide training analogous to that of the former branch academies. It is not economically advantageous to create higher educational institutions along the lines of the branches of service or fields in Ukraine.

The military collegium of the Ministry of Defense that met recently considered the question of the reform of military education, and also discussed the subordination of the higher educational institutions. It is expected that all of the educational institutions—the military university, institutes, divisions, departments, subunits for the military training of the students and the military lycees—will be directly subordinate to the commanders of the branches of the armed forces, the military districts and the chiefs of the directorates in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. The Main Directorate for Military Education is being given the task of overall supervision of the system of military education.

#### **Kobzar Cites Impediments, Calls for New Approaches to Discipline**

94UM0485 Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian  
15 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar, chief of the Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work of the

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Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, under the rubric "Discipline: Problems, Inquiries, Solutions": "A Systematic Approach Must Be Instituted—How To Overcome Non-regulation Relations"]

[Text] The incident that occurred in the motorized-rifle regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Husarenko cannot be called anything but wild. A group of soldiers headed by Junior Sergeant V. Usenko brutally beat Private V. Yarovyy. The youth was taken to the hospital with many wounds...

How do the commanders and comrades-in-arms look to the parents and relatives of Yarovyy now? He went off to the army, after all, healthy and cheerful, with faith that the experienced servicemen would help him overcome all difficulties on his path of emergence.

There are unfortunately many such examples of nonregulation relations and other gross violations of military discipline. The so-called "elders" in the military unit commanded by Colonel V. Antsupov in particular repeatedly tormented young soldiers. Four servicemen, after imbibing, roused young soldiers from their beds at night and beat them harshly at the end of winter.

The number of desertions has increased in that same regiment, and the number of violations of the Temporary Statute for Garrison and Guard Duty has increased considerably.

This naturally cannot help but be disturbing. It should be pointed out that various measures to improve the state of military discipline have unfortunately not proved to be very effective. Or rather, not effective at all, since they do not correspond to the complex situation in the ranks. The greatest uneasiness is evoked by nonregulation relations, so-called barracks hooliganism and evasions of military service.

We will try to answer the questions of where the stereotype of behavior is formed that permits a soldier willingly to submit to the "elders" and facilitate the nonregulation relations; who is continuing these "traditions"; why the sergeants do not act and why the younger officers do not react to this; and, why the "contract people," the commanders of subunits, senior officers and commanders of companies and battalions, do not concern themselves with these issues.

Why (on a broad plane) do these nonregulation relations persist? Is it a tradition, a requirement of military life, a stereotype of thinking or something else?

Who (on a broad plane) is instilling these traditions in the armed forces of Ukraine? Society? The supervisory personnel? Or is this a consequence of the difficult economic situation, the economic dependence of the officers, their fear of "exactingness," for their own future?

Why is the number of incidents of absence without leave from the units increasing? Perhaps because there is not

proper regulation order? Because legal "boundlessness" exists, the commanders have a bad attitude toward the soldiers, they do not see their subordinates as people with a sense of their own worth, with all of their cares, desires and feelings?

I think that the reasons are both in the nonregulation relations and in an unwillingness to serve. Doubtless also the overall attitude toward the army. Not everything is in order with the legislation—shall we analyze who is being drafted? Responsibility and a patriotic attitude toward army service are lacking in society. All of this cannot fail to arouse serious anxiety among the leaders of the armed forces of Ukraine.

In speaking of absence without leave from units and nonregulation relations, it would be an undoubted mistake to feel that morale and spirit can be formed over a very brief period. You cannot proceed by "cavalry charge" here. It may be recalled that the task was outlined quite strictly in the armed forces of the Union: "eliminate nonregulation relations by the end of the month," "instill regulation order by the end of the year" etc. Time passed, however, and the results were not very considerable. Why? The fact is that this negative phenomenon is more than strictly an army problem.

The primary cause of nonregulation relations, in my opinion, is a national character deformed by Stalinist camps and criminal "zones," hunger and violence, and scorned by soldiers. The lack of spirit, the cruelty, the lack of moral norms, the attempts at self-affirmation at the expense of the weak, have long been elements of public consciousness and have set the agenda for a considerable portion of the young people.

Thus, some 88.5 percent of conscript servicemen indicated in a poll conducted in the armed forces that they have personally experienced physical or moral violence on the part of their fellows, relatives or even parents. Many of them feel violence is a constituent element of human interaction, and were inwardly ready for it to be manifested during their service.

The research also showed that 76 percent of those polled did not see any effective measures to counter violence and humiliation, even though they felt hatred toward those who oppress them. Ninety percent of the servicemen with three or four terms of service are convinced that they have a moral right to impose moral and physical terror in the barracks. This category of servicemen moreover feels violence to be a means of compensation for the humiliations they suffered at the beginning of their service, and a means of gaining authority and personal prestige. There are grounds to feel that way—violence is perceived by some of the army youth, at both the conscious and subconscious levels, as the norm for behavior and interaction.

The erosion of moral points of reference in the officer environment has social roots as well. And as sociological and psychological research shows (and what is most



unacceptable), the officers at the platoon and company levels, without knowing how (owing to a lack of experience) to arrange mutual relations with their subordinates, often rely in their work on those who have the authority of force. The barracks hooliganism and physical injustice thus gain, as regrettable as it may be, a semi-official status.

Very troubling is the fact that a considerable portion of the young officers come to the army effectively by force, without any desire to fulfill their constitutional duty. Some 39.4 percent of those polled, research shows, would like to serve under contract, while 30.3 percent of them indicated that they had no personal wish to serve, but "there's nothing you can do." And only 6.4 percent are ready to fulfill their service obligation without hesitation.

More than 60 percent of the young men of draft age, according to the data of the military commissariats, have posture problems by the time they complete their schooling, close to 35 percent have disorders in their cardiovascular system, and close to 30 percent have nervous-psychological disorders. Military practice and special research show that it is precisely the representatives of these categories who get to military units who become the victims of nonregulation relations, are absent without leave from their units and make attempts to take their own lives.

Those convicted of absence without leave explain that among the principal reasons that led them to it were a reluctance to serve in the army, physical injustices and humiliations on the part of their service comrades, and conflicts in the military collective. To these should be added the bad living conditions in some of the units.

Summarizing all of this, one comes to the conclusion that what is required to solve these problems is, **first**, a rise in the vested interest of young people in military service. That could be achieved both through an optimization of service activity and the possibility of selecting the type of service (contract, alternative, term), and through active propaganda work. The propaganda work has to be directed at creating an image for the armed forces of Ukraine as a school of life, and a place where a young person can be physically and morally tempered.

**Second**, the element of criminal liability for absence without leave, which should be in force at any price, could be effective in the future as well.

**Third**, the purposeful formation of a system of interpersonal interaction, with the aim of uniting military collectives and creating an atmosphere of friendship and mutual assistance, has great significance in raising military discipline.

**Fourth**, servicemen must be given broad opportunities to master fields that are useful in the transition to market relations under contemporary conditions during their time in the service.

And one more thing. It is necessary to create suitable service conditions.

An analysis of some of the socioeconomic problems of nonregulation relations and evasions of military service testifies that we are dealing with persistent stereotypes that have been formed in the public consciousness. There is a direct link between the spiritual decline of society and the spiritual decline of the armed forces.

The spiritual resurrection of the armed forces could occur, however, and I am sure at a rapid rate. The armed forces could moreover become one of the principal sources for the formation of the morality and spirituality of society. That is precisely why a profound investigation of our own shortcomings in moral, military and legal indoctrination is essential. It is important that we do everything in our power, under any conditions, so as to destroy the prevailing stereotypes.

One must unfortunately often see dilettantism, carelessness, irresponsibility and attempts to replace painstaking, everyday work with loud shouts and "blow-ups."

A certain portion of the officer corps today has poor knowledge of the requirements of the Ministry of Defense, and they are not guided by them in their activity. This is proved by the low level of knowledge displayed during the inspections in some of the units and formations of the Carpathian and Odessa military districts. It is also proved by the frivolous resolutions of commanders in documents that define the nature and substance of the activity pertaining to strengthening military discipline and preventing offenses.

Some commanders and senior officers moreover feel that the bodies for indoctrination work bear responsibility for the state of military discipline. They are thus trying to become removed from it. The style and methods of activity of some officers remains at the level of yesterday's notions, and do not conform to the new situation. A superficial analysis of work, a reliance on administrative measures alone, a shallow knowledge of sociopsychological processes that occur in the military collectives—all of this does not permit systematic work with anticipation, or the achievement of position results.

Many plans are developed in the units to strengthen military discipline, but most of them, as practice shows, are not carried out.

The bodies for indoctrination work are having difficulty finding their place in the activity to strengthen military discipline and prevent violations. They lack energy and purpose, as well as any orientation toward the specific person. The level of professional activity by the officers in indoctrination work is too low, and the commanders are virtually not trained at all in working with the personnel.

The bodies for indoctrination work must become the organizers of effective interaction of officers with units and formations, and the coordinators of their efforts to

prevent violations and ensure a high level of the moral-psychological state of the personnel.

The practice of summarizing results regarding the state of military discipline and the service of the troops also requires considerable improvement, since the results of verifications testify that a striving to analyze crime statistics and express their emotional attitude toward them and define nonconcrete tasks is at best the principal one among commanders. The personal service activity of specific officers, personal participation in indoctrination work of every senior officer, responsibility for his actions and behavior according to the norms of morality and the law of Ukraine should be analyzed instead. This is topical precisely because shortcomings in the official activity of those to whom the state has entrusted the training and indoctrination of servicemen are at the heart of some of our problems, and acute contemporary problems could be resolved by improving that work alone.

It has become noticeable lately that the command personnel of certain units do not want to take part in indoctrination work, and do not perceive it as a mandatory norm of service.

And more. It must be understood that military discipline is based on the level of the moral-psychological state of the personnel, their attitude toward the fulfillment of their service obligation, and the abilities of the commander to supervise the personnel. And if a commander commits criminal actions for the sake of order, so as to have an effect in the servicemen by force, when other methods have been exhausted, he cannot be blamed for it. That occurs in the armed forces of all civilized countries.

One of the primary measures for the formation of a high spirituality among the personnel, state patriotism and cohesion of the servicemen around the idea of the independence of Ukraine is undoubtedly humanitarian training. It would be expedient to make maximum use of it to establish close ties between the army and the people of Ukraine and their spirituality, morality and culture. It is essential to rely here not only on the commanders of the platoons who conduct the exercises, but also the great scientific potential of the higher educational institutions, enlisting scientists, historians and cultural figures. We have quite a few museums and theaters. Only initiative and a desire to utilize these rich opportunities are lacking.

The demand for classes in humanitarian training is growing, since they will not require any particular expenditures, while the impact on the corresponding organization in strengthening the moral-psychological state of the personnel can be considerable.

I would also like to direct attention to the fact that we are entering into a serious battle with instances of the concealment of offenses, especially barracks hooliganism and evasions of military service. It was ascertained, in a

unit of the Carpathian Military District during an inspection, that a third of the officially reported cases of gross violations were covered up. And the discussion concerns not being late to the formation, but absence without leave from the units, the use of alcoholic beverages, or undignified behavior by servicemen during leaves or in discharge.

The fundamental study of this problem of course requires urgent state resolutions, but we should not have a calm attitude toward such things in the local areas either.

It would be expedient to count among the most important areas of the activity of commanders, staffs and bodies for indoctrination work the creation of an integral system aimed at the formation of respect for the laws of Ukraine, a feeling of personal responsibility for the armed defense of the Fatherland, the necessity of the conscious upholding of the requirements of regulations and executive discipline, and unconditional subordination to commanders and senior officers among all categories of servicemen.

The forms and methods of work that used to be employed, and to which the development of the armed forces should be actively linked today, require more active incorporation.

The effective search, development and expansion of new technologies for the management of the social and sociopsychological processes that lie at the heart of the optimal level of military discipline are required. The bodies for indoctrination work should assume the organization and adoption of scientific approaches to the study of the reasons for offenses, predicting the possible development of processes in military discipline and devising immediate and long-term preventive measures.

The institution of conscious regulation order, a rise in exactingness toward oneself and one's subordinates, an improvement in monitoring, a combination of approaches in indoctrination, including ideological work, and sociopsychological support for the vital activity of the troops within a system that also formulates discipline among the personnel are necessary.

I am certain that the aforementioned tasks can be accomplished to the full extent only with the active participation of all structural elements of military administration and the effective interaction of commanders, staffs and the bodies for indoctrination work.

#### **Air Forces Leaders at Vinnytsya Meeting**

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14 Jun 94 p 1

[Article from press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Fliers Tally the Results"]

[Text] An expanded session of the military council of the Air Forces of Ukraine was held on June 6 in Vinnytsya.

The results of combat training of the Air Forces over the winter training period were summarized.

The deputy chief of the combat training department, Colonel S. Onyshchenko, Air Forces Chief of Staff Major-General Yu. Petrov, Deputy Commander for Weaponry Colonel V. Voloshanovskyy and others spoke candidly in their reports on the objective and subjective difficulties that the personnel of the Air Forces encountered in the course of building this branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Deputy General Procurator of Ukraine Major-General of Justice Volodymyr Lelnyk also participated, and spoke at the session of the military council.

The tasks for the summer training period were assigned by Air Forces of Ukraine Commander Lieutenant-General Volodymyr Antonets.

### **Air Defense Chief Lopatin Comments on Winter Training Results**

94UM0486A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian*  
17 Jun 94 p 1

[Interview with Air-Defense Forces of Ukraine Commander Lieutenant-General Mykhaylo Oleksiyovych Lopatin by Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Korobkov under the rubric "Topical Interview": "The PPO Forces. Responsibility for the Skies of Ukraine"]

[Text] *The results of the winter training period were recently summarized at a military council of the Air-Defense Forces [PPO] of Ukraine. How did the PPO soldiers complete it, what problems and tasks do they face? Our correspondent discussed this with Air-Defense Forces of Ukraine Commander Lieutenant-General Mykhaylo Lopatin.*

[Mykhaylo Lopatin] I think it would be interesting for the readers of *NARODNA ARMIYA* to find out about the results with which the troops completed the training period. I reviewed the central PPO area, and the chief of the General Staff reviewed one of the SAM [surface-to-air missile] units in accordance with the plan. Certain elements of the SAM and electronics units stationed in the area of Kiev were reviewed by the Minister of Defense under the plan. The review was headed by Chief of the Main Directorate of the PPO Forces Lieutenant-General V. Tkachov.

The missile troops of the unit commanded by Colonel L. Paliy should be singled out. They took a solid "four." Solid regulation order reigns there, there were no violations or crimes this year, normal living conditions have been created and the personnel have been provided with everything. Some 52 percent of the other units were evaluated as "good," and 46 percent as "satisfactory," according to the results of the final review. One unit—a detached airfield technical support battalion commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel S. Bezzemennyy—unfortunately received an unsatisfactory rating. The

primary reasons for such a poor result were the lack of logistical reserves and the unsatisfactory state of routine duty activities of the troops.

The SAM battalions headed by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Yevpak and Major Yu. Nalyvayko also received a "two" owing to poor military discipline. The technical battery commanded by Major Yu. Naboko and two radar companies also received "unsatisfactory" ratings, owing to the state of the hardware and the level of training of the personnel.

The units of the Western Air-Defense District handled the tasks of the winter training period very well.

I would like to single out the competent actions of the alert duty forces in assisting an An-2 aircraft that had lost its bearings while flying from Rivne to Rumania. A helicopter went up from the Mukachevo airfield and led the aircraft to the area of the Uzhhorod airfield, where it was able to land. I think that this incident is worthy of a separate feature.

[Viktor Korobkov] The results are clear. Please tell us, if you can, about the tasks of the summer training period.

[Lopatin] The Minister of Defense has approved a statute on the organization of combat alert duty and a plan of action for the alert duty forces that has been coordinated with everyone who takes part in the combat alert duty of the PPO. The primary efforts will therefore be concentrated on instilling order in our service with regard to the requirements of the guiding documents. The most important task is the organization of command-and-control and the interaction of the PPO manpower and assets with the other branches of the armed forces that are involved in combat alert duty with the PPO.

Problem areas that require resolution undoubtedly include adjustments to our plan. It was not fulfilled over the last period for a number of objective reasons. It must now be refined, and the training of the flight personnel must be organized with a regard for the limits on fuels and lubricants.

We will be devoting the principal attention in the training of the air-defense missile and electronics troops, as in the winter training period, to crew exercises, first and foremost at the training and simulation center [NTTs] of the Air-Defense Forces. Our NTTs, by the way, is unique. None of the states of the former Union has anything like it. Considering that the units are not going out to the practice range today, we are planning to increase the quantity of monitored performance evaluations, giving evaluations of the special training according to the results that are demonstrated at that training and simulation center.

One key problem today is preserving the cadres of young officers. The building of the armed forces of Ukraine loses its prospects without that. The commanders and

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training officers at all levels should diligently and comprehensively prepare to receive the graduates of the military schools. The lieutenants must be assigned to posts that conform to their specialties, and be assisted in every way possible in accomplishing their everyday problems and finding jobs for their wives. Today's young officers are the future of our army. I thus personally consider a lieutenant's submission of a request for discharge to be an extraordinary event.

We will also undoubtedly be unable to resolve any issue without a further strengthening of military discipline.

There is one more important task—that of preparing all of the facilities and barracks and housing stock for winter conditions. The funds that have been allocated for that, to our great dismay, are clearly insufficient.

[Korobkov] Mykhaylo Oleksiyovych, a unified PPO system existed at one time in the Soviet Union that also interacted closely with the PPO of the member nations of the Warsaw Pact. I recall that colleagues from the socialist countries were on duty alongside us at the command posts. Does collaboration exist today?

[Lopatin] That is an issue that requires resolution at the international level, and has now virtually been resolved. Documents have been coordinated and signed pertaining to interaction with Poland, Hungary and Belarus. Analogous treaties are now being prepared with the Russian Federation and Rumania.

The presence of direct channels of communication makes it possible to ascertain the purpose of the flight of this or that aircraft in the direction of a state border, and thereby conserve the service life of radar hardware and reduce considerably the number of scrambled takeoffs of fighter aircraft.

By exchanging visits, we have become familiar with the system of training for PPO specialists in neighboring nations and are sharing our experience. The training and simulation center, by the way, has been very highly regarded by the specialists. I repeat that it has no analogue in any of the neighboring nations in its sophistication and extent of approximation of actual conditions. The one that is being created in Russia today is still in the stage of emergence. Ours is operating. We are trying to "run" all of the leading specialists of the ZRV [surface-to-air missile troops] and RTV [electronics troops] through it.

We are constantly exchanging radar information and assisting each other in unforeseen—or, as we say, *force-majeure*—circumstances, as occurred with the An-2 aircraft I was talking about, for example.

Improvement of interaction in the technical realm, relative to the repair of hardware and the acquisition of spare parts, is a special issue. That and, naturally, familiarization and an exchange of models of the hardware that is in service in this or that nation. I think that

such contacts will be expanded. We are already performing joint repairs with Poland on MiG-23 aircraft at our enterprises, with the involvement of Polish specialists. We have a vested interest in broader collaboration with Poland, Hungary and Rumania, as well as with Russia. There is a good base for the repair and operation of passive detection gear in the Czech Republic. The future includes the mutual training of specialists. All of the nations are studying this question. I think that it will also be resolved in the near future.

We have reached agreements with neighboring states with regard to joint meetings, during which we will exchange information on the creation of PPO structures, training of specialists and the organization of combat alert duty.

[Korobkov] So it is possible to speak of a unified PPO system?

[Lopatin] One does not exist. Ukraine has created its own PPO system, which is in constant operation and is able to perform all tasks pertaining to detecting means of aerial attack from various directions and, accordingly, activating all measures to repel violations of the state border and the sovereignty of the country.

[Korobkov] What do you see as the prospects for the development of interaction with the neighboring countries?

[Lopatin] We must move as quickly as possible from the signing of papers to true collaboration, first and foremost in the realm of the training of specialists and the maintenance of hardware in a combat-ready state.

Taking into account the fact that our missile attack warning centers are operating in a unified loop in the interests of Russia and Ukraine, joint financing of the expenditures for the maintenance of those facilities is essential.

It is now time, in general, to summarize everything that has been done over the last two and a half years, and to devise a clear-cut plan of interaction with this or that state. The areas of that interaction are not identical, and each has its own specific nature. We would like to collaborate with Hungary, for example, on a program of automating command-and-control processes. They do that better than us.

We must calculate in general how much this or that information costs, and compare it with the cost of maintaining the corresponding facilities. We have two facilities, for example, that are operating in the interests of the Russian Federation and partly for Ukraine. They are unprofitable today, since we do not have all of the information with regard to the monitoring of outer space. We need an automated system for the receipt and processing of that information (from Russia and other nations). Its use is very important to us, since Ukraine wants to be—and will be—a space power.



It should be pointed out, most unfortunately, that Russia still does not want to collaborate very much with Ukraine on many issues. That pertains especially to the realm of space and questions of the further upgrading and procurement of weaponry.

There are other examples as well. We are developing proposals in conjunction with Hungary and Poland to organize interaction among the neighboring electronics battalions. Say a battalion is on alert duty on the Polish side—it will then inform us of the aerial situation as well. We will provide them with such information as well. By instituting this program, we would resolve many other issues as well; an economic plan on a bilateral basis is being discussed in particular. I would point out that the border with Poland is more than five hundred kilometers, so the impact will be large.

[Korobkov] Will we be able to talk about an open airspace between neighboring countries?

[Lopatin] Yes indeed. That would conform entirely to the position of open skies. Not in the sense of anybody flying wherever they want, of course. Open skies are when one side informs the other that it is planning a flight, what is flying and what is now in the air. It is easier to prevent possible PPO actions that way. I would say also that such interaction with all of the neighboring states would not only strengthen the position of Ukraine, but would also facilitate a lessening of tensions that arise in the use of the airspace.

Such then are the problems that face our PPO Forces today, and such are the tasks that we are resolving.

[Korobkov] That you for the interesting discussion, Mykhaylo Oleksiyovych.

#### 14th Air Force Flight Training Problems Noted

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15 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya: "A Military Council is Conducting a 'Flight Investigation'"]

[Text] The truth is that there were very few actual flights in the air units of the 14th Air Army over the winter training period. This was noted at a session of the Military Council of the army that was held at the end of last week in Lviv. It was devoted to summarizing the results of training over the winter period. The report cited quite a few concrete numbers pertaining to the fulfillment of the plan for combat and, in particular, flight training. I will not quote them here, but will rather just point out that for the most part they did not exceed 20 percent. This indicator is of course not the best. The reason for this situation is well known—the scarcity of fuels and lubricants.

The negative consequences that arise as a consequence of the reduced level of combat training were also discussed.

These include the partial—or even complete—loss of flight proficiency and qualifications among the pilots, which has a less than desirable effect on the fighting ability of the air units. The ground specialists are also losing their professional skills, since they are not engaged in flight control or support.

There is another negative phenomenon that arises when the rhythm of aviator training is disrupted. Eminent military figures had long since pointed out that when an army is not occupied with its business, it is transformed into a bureaucratic system, and its levels of organization and discipline fall. It self-destructs. This conclusion is unfortunately finding confirmation in our armed forces as well, and especially in the Air Forces. Quite a few examples were cited at the session of the Military Council of gross violations of the requirements of regulations and laws. The problem of strengthening military discipline in the air units is thus a very acute one today. The commanders of the air army see increased exactingness toward commanders at all levels, the institution of regulation order and the strict punishment of both the perpetrators themselves and their commanders as the way of improving matters. Time will tell what results those measures will have.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Cadre Problems Key Issue for Military

944K1719B Baku AZERBAJDZHAN in Russian  
9 Jul 94 p 3

[Report by KHABAR-SERVIS correspondent E. Makhmudov: "According to State Adviser, the Time Has Come To Search for Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict Instead of Propagandistic War"]

[Text] Ambassador Vafa Guluzade, the foreign policy state adviser, delivered a report on the organizational development of the National Army of Azerbaijan at the conference "Military Support for Democratization in Europe," organized by the headquarters of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. The Azerbaijani diplomat told a KHABAR-SERVIS agency correspondent that this gathering discussed such issues as the military's relation to politics, its role in providing humanitarian help, and the use of the military in the hot spots of the planet.

In his report, V. Guluzade told of the difficulties in the development of Azerbaijan's Armed Forces, where the main problem, by fault of the former USSR leadership, is the shortage of skilled military cadres, since most servicemen of Azerbaijani origin served in noncombatant units.

The state adviser also voiced support for the NATO Partnership for Peace program, which Azerbaijan has joined. "While in the past, peace and stability were based on the confrontation of two camps—socialist and capitalist—after the disintegration of the USSR the world order must be based on cooperation among developed

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countries and the states that have formed as a result of this disintegration, and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In this connection, cooperation between the military will play an important role," said the state adviser.

### Improved Social Services for Military

944K1781B Yerevan *RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA*  
in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The President Has Issued an Edict"]

[Text] On 11 July 1994, Republic of Armenia President Levon Ter-Petrosyan signed the Edict "On Additional Measures To Improve Social Support for Servicemen and Their Family Members." The edict exempts from the payment of fees for instruction in schools and preschool facilities the children of servicemen and freedom fighters who have died defending the Republic of Armenia or became disabled as a result of combat actions. The Republic of Armenia Government has been instructed to provide in the draft state budget, effective in 1995, funds for repaying the interest on credit extended to the families of fallen servicemen for individual apartment construction, as well as to provide funds for the relatives of servicemen to take care of the tombs of the fallen, buried outside of the Yeralbur pantheon.

### Military Firearms Banned in Baku

944K1788B Baku *BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY* in Russian  
15 Jul 94 p 2

[AZERTADZH report: "In the Name of the Citizens' Tranquillity"]

[Text] To prevent negative phenomena connected with the bearing and use of firearms and bladed weapons and explosives and to ensure the safety of the peaceful population and also to prevent the appearance on the streets and in public places of Baku of servicemen without the appropriate papers and civilians, the chief of the Baku Garrison, Colonel R. Amirov, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces, has issued orders banning the carrying of weapons and regulating the wearing of military uniform on the territory of the garrison.

Wearing field service dress outside of the units in the Baku Garrison is henceforward prohibited. The appearance of servicemen in the city shall be limited to the minimum.

## CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

### Labor Protests Defense Plant Conditions

944K1665A Almaty *KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*  
in Russian 30 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Konstantin Kim, *KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*: "Word of Honor Has Lost Value"]

[Text] The collective of one of the largest enterprises in the oblast—the Kazakkumulyator joint-stock company—has decided to begin a strike in the early days of July and to picket the city and oblast administrations. The workers intend to resort to this extreme measure unless their demands are met as set forth in the petition sent to the local authorities.

An enterprise that at one time was progressive and worked for defense has today found itself in a critical situation. Whereas two or three years ago the primary cause was thought to be the decline of production because of the reduction of military orders and the severing of business ties, mutual nonpayment has now been added to that. This is an especially local problem. The AO [joint-stock company] owes 5.4 million tenge just for electric power. But in late May the power was cut off altogether, so that the shops and boiler rooms were shut down. As of 1 July water was also turned off to the alkaline battery plant, because it has an unpaid water bill of more than 2 million tenge. At the same time, Oblteplokommunenergo and the city of Taldykorgan went into debt almost 18 million tenge for water. The trouble is that more than half of the housing stock, enterprises, and organizations in the oblast center use hot water and heat from its boiler room. You cannot count on the city; this is the second summer the public has had no hot water. There is every reason to believe that the city will freeze this winter. Work in the boiler room to prepare for the heating season came to a halt because there was no money. The AO cannot pay bills for supplies and spare parts. The coal that is arriving is not being unloaded. The enterprise's work force has itself been without work for two months.

As a matter of fact, throughout the entire last heating season, the plant supplied the city and hot water gratis, on the word of honor of the leaders of the local administration. When the time came to settle up, the collective was confronted with the fact that the treasury is empty. The workers responded to this by asking the leaders of the city and oblast the sensible question: Why then are the people who write the budget regularly receiving their salaries, when they themselves are hardly able to make ends meet?

In its petition, the Kazakkumulyator collective demanded that the enterprise be allowed to collect the debt from Oblteplokommunenergo and other debtors unconditionally. That money would be more than enough to pay off the debts to the electric power distributor and the oblast water and sewer department, to pay wages, and to resume operation.

The motor pools of the Taldykorganavtokolik joint-stock company have also been carrying freight on a word of honor—without advance payment. They have worked themselves into a loss. The enterprise's debt amounts to 24 million tenge. More than half of the fleet is idle because of the grave financial situation. They have nothing with which to buy fuel, lubricants, spare parts, tires. The drivers have not been paid for months.

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The truckers were putting great stock in the clearing of delinquent debt conducted by decree of the president of the Republic. But in the end they received, as Yermek Yesbatyrov, the company's general manager, put it, 'the hole in the bagel,' although the company is operating in the black. They have more than 18 million tenge on the plus side. But that money is frozen in a special account in a branch of the National Bank. Somehow they managed to free up 4.5 million tenge. That was barely enough to pay part wages to the drivers. The other 14 million are not being unfrozen. So far, appeals to the oblast administration and the government have not helped.

"In that case, we do not understand why the clearing was done," Ye. Yesbatyrov said in surprise. "Enterprises are still in a vicious circle of nonpayment, just as they were before. We cannot obtain the money we have earned from customers. Which means that we have nothing with which to pay for gasoline, diesel fuel, and lubricants. Neftesnab in turn has nothing with which to obtain fuel. The time is coming when the harvest has to be hauled, a new cycle will start all over again. Again they will force us to work for a word of honor."

#### Defense Industry Conversion Decree Noted

944K1750A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 27,  
9 Jul 94 p 9

[Unattributed report: "The Cabinet of Ministers Has Adopted the Decree: "Measures for Realization of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Conversion of the Defense Industry"]

[Text] The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan recently adopted the decree "Measures for Realization of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Conversion of the Defense Industry."

The decree provides for a number of priority administrative measures of the government that it has been forced to adopt in connection with the progress of conversion.

The Ministry of Economics is prior to 30 November 1994 in conjunction with the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Science and New Technology, the Ministry of Energy, and other interested departments to have made an analysis of the actual state of all enterprises and institutions that it is now customary to rank in the conversion category.

After full information on the state of the defense industry has been obtained, a republic program of conversion, which will be prepared by the Ministry of Economics in conjunction with the Ministry of Industry and other interested departments, is to appear within three months' time.

Similar programs are to be presented, for their part, by the chiefs of the oblast administrations and also of the cities of Almaty and Leninsk.

One further program, which will be handled by the State Property Committee in conjunction with the Ministry of Economics, is to determine the conditions of the privatization of "individual units of the property complex of the converted enterprises with the funds thus obtained being channeled into the financing of conversion programs." It is also to determine "the procedure of the conservation of unique narrowly specialized equipment freed up as a result of conversion."

The decree is prior to the adoption of global programs to afford defense industry a number of advantages, which will include the allocation, as a priority, of foreign currency loans for the preparation and organization of civilian processes, and the Kazkontrakt Corporation has been ordered "as a priority, to help the conversion enterprises to acquire resources." The decree also promises an absence of problems with the transfer to the books of the local administrations of defense industry's general amenities and welfare facilities and funds "for the retraining of the personnel of the conversion enterprises."

Understandably, such a prospect is none too reassuring for the personnel itself. Such decisions illustrate, rather, the impotence of the government, which does not know how it should handle the industrial potential that has come totally unexpectedly into its hands. There is no guarantee that even the modest priorities that have been determined in the decree will not remain merely paper priorities.

#### Altynbayev Reviews Armed Forces Readiness

944K1807A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 15 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by Aybas Syzdykov, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA: "Air Force Is the Target...of Journalists"]

[Text] A press conference conducted in Aktyubinsk by General Lieutenant M.K. Altynbayev, commander of the Kazakhstan Air Force, was dedicated to the formation of the Kazakhstan Air Force, a difficult accomplishment.

The Kazakhstan Air Force is today outfitted with fairly sophisticated aircraft and aviation equipment. The aircraft comprise fourth-generation supersonic fighter-bombers, ground-attack planes, helicopters, and military transport aircraft. The Kazakhstan Air Force is fully handling its entrusted mission—to defend the borders and airspace of Kazakhstan. When necessary, 90 percent of aviation assets can become airborne to accomplish the mission. At the present time, however, these assets are basically standing idle on the airfields. There are many reasons for this. First of all, the lack of funds is having a critical effect. Matters are reaching the point where every flight training mission is personally approved by the Air Force commander. There is a shortage of petroleum, oil, lubricants, and spare parts.

The personnel problem is especially acute. Air Force units are manned to the 50-70 percent strength level, and the exodus of people continues. Military specialists are

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being discharged and are leaving for Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In order to replenish the ranks of Air Force units with competent, qualified specialists, the Kazakhstan Air Force School was opened as part of the Aktyubinsk Civil Aviation Higher Flight Training Academy. The school will train aircraft and helicopter pilots, airspace management specialists, engineers, and other technical specialists. The Air Force School was established without any additional investment of monetary assets. Already existing large-scale production bases, major training and laboratory facilities, highly qualified flight instructor personnel, engineers, technicians, instructors, and professors—all were set in motion to accomplish this.

Responding to a question concerning interaction between the Kazakhstan Air Force and Russia, M.K.

Altynbayev noted that Russia and Kazakhstan advocate a unified defense space, unified operational planning, and proceeding from this—the prospect of unified defensive armament, joint combat patrolling, and mutual assistance. He stated that no one today will be able to confront an enemy in isolation.

Many questions were posed to the commander of the Kazakhstan Air Force at this press conference—on the combat capabilities of aircraft and helicopter assets, cooperation with the republic's civil aviation department, contacts with NATO, and the housing and everyday living conditions of servicemen. After all, none of us can be indifferent to the fate of the Air Force of sovereign Kazakhstan.



## ARMS TRADE

### Legislation on Aviation Technology Export Controls

944D0071A Moscow PRAVO I EKONOMIKA  
in Russian No 9, 26 Apr 94 (Signed to press 25 Apr 94)  
p 3

["Decree of the Russian Federation Government No. 189, 9 March 1994, 'On Confirmation of the Statute on Procedure for the Manufacture of Avionics and Dual-Use Technologies and Export Versions of Military Aviation Technology and Equipment For It With the Use of Investments'"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Government decrees:

1. To confirm the attached Statute on Procedure for the Manufacture of Avionics and Dual-Use Technologies and Export Versions of Military Aviation Technology and Equipment For It With the Use of Investments, elaborated by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and coordinated with the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry.

2. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense shall present to the Russian Federation Government, during the second quarter of 1994, a draft federal investment program for the manufacture of avionics and dual-use technologies and export versions of military aviation technology and equipment for it for the period prior to the year 2000. The draft program shall have been coordinated with concerned ministries and departments and provide for the inclusion of investment projects developed by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force) and the all-Russian association Russian Aviation Fund out of nonbudget funds obtained from sales of aviation equipment in 1992-1993.

[Signed] Chairman of the Russian Federation Government  
V. Chernomyrdin

### Statute on Procedure for the Manufacture of Avionics and Dual-Use Technologies and Export Versions of Military Aviation Technology and Equipment For It With the Use of Investments

1. This statute is developed in accordance with Directive of the Council of Ministers—Government of the Russian Federation No. 1392-r, dated 9 August 1993, and determines the activity conditions, as well as the basic functions and rights of participants, in projects to manufacture avionics and dual-use technologies and export versions of military aviation technology and equipment for it with the use of investments (henceforth referred to as avionics and dual-use technologies).

2. Participants in investment activity include the investor (general investor), general client, and developer (main developer) of the project.

The investor (general investor) in a project to manufacture avionics and dual-use technologies may be a physical or juridical person, including foreigners.

The main developer is responsible for the cooperative effort of all developers participating in the implementation of individual investment projects and the federal investment program for manufacturing avionics and dual-use technologies and export versions of military aviation technology and equipment for it for the period prior to the year 2000, as well as for series production output.

3. The legal relationships among investment activity participants are established on a contract basis between the investor (general investor), the general client, and the developer (main developer).

4. Investment activity entities include newly built and modernized aircraft, including series production aircraft, their component and spare parts, outfitting and equipment used in aircraft, scientific-technical production output and technological processes used in aircraft manufacture, consumer goods produced with the use of aviation technologies, materials, and production capacities, as well as modernized airfields and airfield structures, housing, and production infrastructure.

Transport and sporting aircraft (helicopters), scientific-technical production output, and dual-use aviation equipment and other property may be sold to the investor as compensation for funds invested.

Export combat and training aircraft (helicopters), airfields, airfield structures, as well as certain types of equipment, scientific-technical production output, and technological processes specially stipulated by contract do not constitute entities investment in the development of which entails acquisition by the investor of right of ownership to them. In these instances, the contract envisages the possibility of subsequent investor participation in income obtained from the sale and use of such entities.

5. The general client for a project to manufacture avionics and dual-use technologies is the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force), which ensures compliance with a unified scientific-technical policy and protection of the scientific and technological achievements of the state.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force) makes decisions on the expansion of specific investment programs, determines the investor (general investor), places orders on a contract basis jointly with the investor (general investor) at industrial enterprises for development and production of specific types of aviation equipment, provides investors payment documents with respect to payment for work performed and output manufactured, and engages in the presentation of complaints and filing of claims on behalf of investors through

the requisition system of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force) in accordance with normative acts on procedure for the manufacture of military avionics.

6. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force) shall ensure:

- conformance of the tactical and technical characteristics and qualities of manufactured avionics to the tactical and technical mission, and to the requirements of state (sector) standards and other normative acts;
- accomplishment of the volume of work, testing, and acceptance of finished production output as prescribed by technical documentation within the time frame determined in the contract, along with registration of the necessary official documents (licenses) on acceptance (certification).

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### Institute Head on Problems in Defense Conversion

94UM0501A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
5 Jun 94 p 8

[Interview with Aleksey Nikolayevich Shulunov, director of Central Radiotechnical Scientific Research Institute, president of the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises, by DELOVOY MIR columnist Moisey Gelman, date, place and occasion not specified, under rubric "Production": "Semineglected Conversion"; photograph of Shulunov included]

[Text] *Conversion of military-industrial complex enterprises cannot be viewed or conducted in isolation, separate on the one hand from realization of new military doctrine and the rearming of the Army connected with it, and on the other hand from the reform of our unbalanced economy. DELOVOY MIR columnist Moisey Gelman talks about problems of conversion and development paths with Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises, director of Central Radiotechnical Scientific Research Institute.*

[Gelman] The majority of military-industrial complex enterprises belong to the state. As postwar experience shows, they will not be able to change their kind of activity with greatest benefit for society without a proprietary hand. Aleksey Nikolayevich, in your view what kind of strategy and management of conversion should there be?

[Shulunov] Conversion of the military-industrial complex is being carried out for the second time in the last 50 years. While conversion went rather quickly and in an organized manner after the end of the Great Patriotic War inasmuch as it was based on a rigid, state, planned, industrial and financial policy, the present one is spontaneous: its successes depend fully on the decision of

each of the approximately 3,000 independently functioning military-industrial complex enterprises—plants, OKB [special design bureaus], scientific research institutes. This occurs as a result of an insufficiently considered conversion ideology and because of the absence of funds, of clear prospects for producing both defense as well as necessary civilian products, of an effective financing mechanism, of corresponding regulatory documents, and of a market infrastructure. But perhaps the most important reason for the present failures of conversion is the psychology of economic and state leaders of all ranks and of specialists, which remains the same as before: they can create and manufacture products, but for now without proper consideration of market needs and they cannot carry on trade in the products. Therefore first and foremost it was necessary to develop conceptual approaches, clearly understand our goals based on what we have and what we wish to reform, and determine the rules of the game for all and for each enterprise.

Military-industrial complex enterprises were producing a clear surplus of military equipment and arms whose export was strongly reduced in recent years while consumption within the country has been cut back substantially. At the same time, many technologies of military-industrial complex enterprises are obsolete and their products do not always conform to modern demands.

Our commodity production never has been balanced, especially now after disintegration of the USSR. We were purchasing materials, semimanufactures, complete sets, dyes and chemicals as well as final products abroad for an annual average of \$30 billion. Therefore it is necessary to assess our needs for particular products that previously were imported and begin producing them here after converting the corresponding enterprises. Thus, money must be invested above all in those technologies which will allow saving currency. For example, in Soviet times oilmen would purchase five billion dollars worth of equipment annually. After disintegration of the USSR, seven billion dollars worth already is required in Russia today.

Another vast sphere requiring its share of conversion consists of the technologies of harvesting, processing, transporting and storing farm products. Their imperfection turns into annual losses of approximately 30 percent of the harvest.

Military-industrial complex enterprises use numerous technologies previously inaccessible to the remaining part of industry because they were classified. Today their transfer to all sectors of the national economy is necessary.

There also are other strategic directions of conversion. But conversion will be doomed without a planned state policy. Not only our postwar experience, but also the unsuccessful experience of conversion conducted in the United States during the 1960's and 1970's attests to the need to conduct such a policy. Having ended up without

state support, approximately 90 percent of U.S. companies failed, among them also the famous firm of Boeing, which was attempting to master production of intercity buses. Having replaced the word "plan" with "market," we thereby separated state tasks from state management functions, although we try to conduct conversion on a pseudoplanned basis. But it is impossible to be just a little pregnant.

**[Gelman]** Conversion programs are to be developed and introduced in a package of measures for building a balanced market economy. What do you see these ways to be?

**[Shulunov]** With all the shortcomings of our present economic system, which is devoid of market feedback, the rejection of macroeconomic planning of production based on an intersectorial balance was a serious, even tragic mistake. Dashing from one extreme, where everything from needles to aircraft was planned and distributed, to the other, total anarchy, is called a transition period for some reason, although specifically macroeconomic planning would have been the necessary foundation for indicative reform management, including conversion. The fact is, such planning is an invariable attribute of government activity in any developed country. If 75 percent of our gross domestic product [GDP] consists of means of production and the rest is means of consumption, then we cannot get by without centralized intervention in order at least to equalize these portions. It is like in a band: no matter how good its musicians may be as professionals, without a director and a score there will be cacophony instead of a composition. Therefore it is necessary to write a score for reforms and outline the range and descriptions of commodities which are of great state importance. Then the ways of structural perestroika of the economy will become clear and it will be necessary to give all kinds of support to manufacturing that product which enjoys a demand on the world market. Many enterprises naturally will prove to be unnecessary, but they will be abolished or converted according to the plan, while thinking first of all about people and their retraining. Today each enterprise is being reformed according to its own understanding, often increasing the imbalance of commodity production.

**[Box insert]** In the assessments of experts, our present conversion will last 7-10 years and will require approximately \$150 billion. Essentially only \$117 billion (in 1992 prices) were allocated for conversion over the last two years. The cost of conversion is commensurable with volumes of GDP, and brushing aside problems of its financing means becoming like the ostrich: neither enterprises' own funds nor private capital is enough for its implementation. **[End box insert]**

**[Gelman]** Such chaos may lead to another crisis phase—overproduction of a particular product. Recently 19 new enterprises for producing television sets were created on account of conversion, although I recall that in the late 1980's the sets, even color sets, were being sold on credit because of overproduction.

**[Shulunov]** The danger of overproduction and of a qualitatively new crisis phase is not precluded. This is why the creation of a balanced economy is required, which is impossible without centralized planning and restoration of a credit and financial system. Unfortunately, credits and finances today have been separated from commodity production, although they are called upon to service it and cannot exist independently. Speculation in money leads only to its devaluation. Today it is not commodity production that is the priority for us, but the fight against inflation by any methods.

**[Gelman]** Conversion programs of military-industrial complex enterprises must be coordinated with Russia's new military doctrine. What are its fundamental provisions with respect to rearming the Army?

**[Shulunov]** The new military doctrine only declares the need for its rearming. Therefore a long-range program of rearming and technical modernization of the Army must be developed. Often 8-10 years go by from development of new weapon systems to their mass introduction to the troops, and they usually are operational for 25-30 years. During this time military strategy and tactics change, and so Army weapons and equipment are improved. These factors also must be taken into account in a future program. But the important thing is the creation of precision weapons and modern means of rapid troop movement, and also restoration of strategic arms to the level of defense sufficiency, inasmuch as a considerable portion of them remained in former Union republics.

The absence of a program for rearming prevents seriously planning and beginning the reform and conversion of military-industrial complex enterprises, since it is not known which of them should continue to work on defense and which should change their kind of activity.

**[Gelman]** The uncertainty with military orders and with the financing forces many enterprises to remain hostages of the existing situation. They found themselves threatened with destruction, which is fraught with serious consequences not only for national security, but also in the social sphere: on the order of 15 million persons are employed there (together with the service infrastructure). What must be undertaken to prevent a breakdown of the military-industrial complex?

**[Shulunov]** This depends not so much on the military as on the government and Federal Assembly, which finally are obligated to resolve problems of financing defense orders and conversion and to come to a precise agreement that budget appropriations for defense should be reduced, for example, from 18 percent of GDP in 1989 to 6 percent in 2000. But these decisions again are connected with development of a long-range arms program which also takes financing of the program into account. And for now military-industrial complex enterprises are forced to take credits to fulfill state orders due to the state debt and the absence of working capital. Last year alone they paid \$400 billion to repay credit, while the state continues to be their debtor.



**[Gelman]** In your opinion, how should conversion be financed?

**[Shulunov]** An incorrect scheme of financing conversion projects is a fundamental mistake of organizers of the present avalanching, chaotic conversion. The fact is, both client and performer as a rule act in the form of one person, the conversion enterprise, and projects are financed through commercial banks and without necessary control. The result of this was parallelism in developing new conversion products. For example, 12 plants simultaneously mastered production of oil producing pumping units, while three plants can satisfy the requirement for them. In addition, up to 70-80 percent of allocated funds did not reach conversion enterprises or were placed at their disposal with an enormous delay. It ended up where conversion credits actually went to pay off commercial banks.

In our opinion, conversion money must be allocated to the client of civilian products (transport workers, gas workers, oilmen, farmers and so on), who will select for themselves the performers of conversion programs on a competitive basis. With such financing the client also is capable of finding additional funds if he is interested in realizing his project. Conversion projects must have serious technical and economic grounds and undergo independent expert examination. With meager state financing, it is necessary to make wide use of funds of various joint stock companies and banks and also attract foreign capital.

It is necessary to attract commercial banks for allotting conversion credits under the following conditions: impermissibility of diverting allocated resources for commercial credits to third parties; precise determination of time periods for drawing up documents connected with obtaining credits; harsh sanctions with respect to commercial banks for violating terms of granting credit; Russian Central Bank supervision over the activity of commercial banks financing conversion projects.

A merger of various financial structures with production is inevitable under conversion. It would appear to be most rational to accumulate money intended for conversion financing in regions in the corresponding oblast, kray and republic conversion assistance funds. Fund income should be formed from allocations from the local budget and contributions from interested commercial structures with any form of ownership, from enterprises, from fund founders and so on. The state could support such funds by granting them tax exemptions and cost benefits.

It is very important that conversion projects be financed continuously (in 1992 money came in July and in 1993 it came in August). And the military-industrial complex could do this in part independently, above all from extrabudgetary funds, and also from the wide export of arms and military equipment. The fact is, a decrease of state orders for arms and military equipment by no

means always permits partially curtailing production capacities. This concerns flow-line technologies above all. Take aircraft production. Whether ten or a hundred are needed, one still must keep the entire production line in working capacity without reducing costs. Therefore defense enterprises must be given wide freedom for arms export in order to make effective use of the present potential of the military-industrial complex and earn funds for conversion.

**[Box insert]** Splendid technological equipment has been created in the Leningrad Mekhanobr Association for recycling many kinds of military equipment, and its production also must be included in corresponding conversion programs. **[End box insert]**

**[Gelman]** How is conversion going today?

**[Shulunov]** Over the last two years around a thousand conversion programs, including 14 federal programs, have been developed and have undergone expert examination. They include "Russian Navy Revival," "Civilian Aircraft Development," "Developments and Production of New Kinds of Medical Equipment" and so on. In addition, regional programs have been developed in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Udmurtia, in Sverdlovsk and Rostov oblasts and so on, but they also are [not] being fulfilled because of poor financing. The fact is, money was allocated only for a tenth of all programs.

One should note successes of defense enterprises in creating new passenger aircraft (particularly the IL-96 and IL-204) and helicopters. Military-industrial complex enterprises will take part in designing high-speed railroads, developing the Barents Sea oil shelf, and creating petrochemical equipment. The domestic industry, including the military-industrial complex, is capable of rapidly mastering production of the entire necessary set of equipment for the oil and gas industry for that money which we spend annually on its import.

There are tens of thousands of possible conversion projects. It is impossible to enumerate them all. I would like to note that even under the present unfavorable conditions, the defense establishment somehow is building up the manufacture of civilian products by approximately 2 percent annually.

**[Gelman]** Obviously one direction for conversion of the military-industrial complex is the introduction of technologies for recycling arms and military equipment and other property. It is no secret that an enormous amount of written-off ships, tanks and aircraft have accumulated in the Army. At the same time, there is not enough scrap for smelting metals and so the amount of ore used for this has grown. Military electronic equipment with gold-containing components is written off each year, but industry does not recover it. There are enormous reserves for further (but now civilian) use of many engines and vehicles which have served their time in the Army, but are suitable in peacetime life after some renovation. Much more can be enumerated that is subject to recycling. The



**profit from secondary use of military property which has used up its life can be enormous. What place is set aside in conversion programs for secondary recovery and use of resources?**

[Shulunov] For a long time there has not been the amount of garbage dumps and equipment graveyards in a single leading country such as we have. Their recycling is a component part of world industrial production. In particular, half of the metals abroad are smelted from scrap. Here too we finally have turned to recycling. A corresponding program has been developed within the framework of conversion, subsidies for which will be needed only for recycling strategic nuclear missiles; it will be profitable for all the rest. I will give just one example. Over the last 20 years around a thousand tons of gold were used in our military equipment, not to mention other valuable as well as rare-earth metals. And we have to introduce technologies for their complex recovery by building corresponding concentration factories.

With respect to turning written-off tanks and ships into scrap metal, microexplosion methods have been developed for this that are more productive than conventional gas cutting. And commercial enterprises are ready to take up this work; only an appropriate organization of matters is needed.

**[Gelman] What must be undertaken for wide involvement of private capital in conversion?**

[Shulunov] This requires above all normalizing the general economic situation in the country. Businessmen do not wish to invest money for long-term projects because of the continuous devaluation of the ruble. They undertake investments basically when recoupment of investments does not exceed a year. Nevertheless, the ice has begun to break. The most far-sighted business people invested their money in creating new civilian aircraft and refrigerators. There are plenty of completed developments awaiting their hour of introduction.

Many already understand that reform of our economy is impossible without conversion of the military-industrial complex, but if it is not properly financed and managed, then all conversion programs will turn out to be hare-brained schemes. Like Earth, you will not create conversion from chaos without the direction of a "superior office"—like the market economy as a whole, by the way.

### **Nuclear Shipbuilding Center Hit by Conversion Failure**

94UM0496A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 7 Jul 94  
p 3

[Article by Yuriy Golotyuk under rubric "The 'Vavorok'": "Russia's Nuclear Might Is Maintained Free at the Northern Machine Building Enterprise: Nuclear Powered Submarine Builders Have Not Yet Coped With Conversion"]

[Text] It is not precluded that electricity will be turned off in Severodvinsk tomorrow or the day after, as there is no money to pay the power workers. Local boiler rooms already have cleaned out the solid and liquid fuel reserves: the heating season had to be ended a month earlier than usual, and hot water also stopped coming to homes on 24 June. This would not be too bad—it is an average little Russian city of 300,000 in far-off Arkhangelsk Guberniya... But the fact is, in this case TsAS, the state Nuclear Shipbuilding Center, the only yard in Russia and the largest in Europe from whose shipbuilding ways nuclear powered submarines are launched, also will not receive power.

Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko, who visited Severodvinsk at the end of last week, was met at the gates of the Sevmash PO [Northern Machine Building Enterprise Production Association] by one lone picket protesting against the Ministry of Defense delaying payment of money for military orders fulfilled by Severodvinsk personnel (no less than R250 billion). One need not be surprised—they have become too accustomed to visits by leaders here: the entire Russian leadership has called on Sevmash in recent times. The only one who did not come was Gaydar. They were already preparing for his visit here, but Yegor Timurovich was removed from his position prematurely... (Of all recent visitors only one delegation, that of the Grand Duke House of Romanov, drew a crowd of the curious at the enterprise: it was interesting, they are princes after all.) In addition, military-industrial complex enterprises always had a reputation for harsh discipline; to this day protest actions here are considered a sign of ill breeding. And no matter how difficult things may be, defense industry workers believe in the State as in God—in the State with a capital "S," whether it be the Union, Russia or whatever. One can understand them in principle. Just as it had a state order for producing nuclear powered submarines, so the Nuclear Shipbuilding Center has it to this day. Nineteen nuclear powered submarines of two modifications now stand in various degrees of readiness on shipbuilding ways of the Northern Machine Building Enterprise Production Association: here they build the Tayfun, which carries strategic missiles, and the Bars, armed with cruise missiles. And the shipbuilders were not told about a single one of them: "Give it up, we don't need it." This is understandable: according to international agreements, silo missiles in Russia's nuclear strategy must fade into the background in the future and concede their place to submarine-based missiles. And correspondingly, to deprive oneself of a production base putting out missile-carrying submarines essentially would signify rejection of nuclear weapons in general for Russia. The last bottle of champagne was broken against the hull of a newly built submarine which exited the enterprise caisson gate just a month ago. The next one was planned to be launched in

the fall, but... There have been difficulties with set-completing articles, many of which were being manufactured outside of Russia in Ukraine and Moldova... It seems the time limits will be totally wrecked.

Yes, of course, nowadays Sevmash is far from what it was previously. "More than half of today's Russian submarine fleet order of battle slid right from these ways; in our best times we launched an average of four submarines a year," says Sevmash Deputy Chief Engineer Oleg Maksimenko with nostalgia. "I will not say how many we are building now, these are classified figures, but believe me, it is incomparably fewer." Severodvinsk's shining hour fell in the mid-1970's, when the enterprise was renovated for producing the new series of Tayfun strategic missile-carrying submarines. Financing was practically unlimited: the important thing was to catch up with and overtake America under water! Several unfinished shops remain as a monument to those bright times for Sevmash people: money for their completion is not anticipated in the foreseeable future, and they are hardly needed by anyone now. It is not about fat: nowadays the plant is in a far from honorable 17th place in average level of pay among Severodvinsk's scarce industrial enterprises. It cannot be said this is causing a drain of workers: just as around 40,000 persons used to work at Sevmash, they still work there. But this constancy is linked above all with the fact that the Nuclear Ship-building Center is the main enterprise in the city. Strictly speaking, Severodvinsk was built for it, and there is nowhere to go in particular.

When serious pressure began—and financing difficulties began from about 1990—the Sevmash people honestly tried to convert at least somewhat, but producing equipment for the agroindustrial complex proved to be not quite such a profitable matter as it appeared initially. And some twenty river barges and a pair of harbor tugs built for the Dutch under contract also were of no decisive importance. Hopes linked with the production of floating platforms for developing the shelf's natural gas fields also most likely will prove just as illusory. There also are not many clients for the tourist submarine Neptun, produced at Sevmash in a single copy, although she underwent sea trials... To a certain extent the state of affairs is being saved by the fact that the enterprise not only produces submarines, but also engages in recycling them. Sevmash is the world's only shipyard with experience in working with titanium submarine hulls (at one time the Americans planned to set up the output of missile-carrying titanium submarines, but later evidently deemed this to be a luxury; the cost of a titanium hull is tens of times higher than that of a steel hull). Therefore taking apart titanium submarines is the prerogative of Sevmash. "Although it is said that breaking up allegedly is not the same as building and your heart does not bleed, what kind of work is this?" they say at the plant. By the way, this already is not the first "recycling" period in Sevmash history: they specialized in cutting up cruisers and battleships here during Khrushchev's reduction of the Navy.

...One Severodvinsk old-timer used the unfamiliar word "vavorok" to describe the present condition of the Northern Machine Building Enterprise. There is an explanation in the "Pomorskiy tolkovyy slovar russkogo moreplavaniya" [Pomor Explanatory Dictionary of Russian Seafaring]: "Vavorok is the corpse of a marine animal cast ashore by the sea which has not had time to decompose."

#### **Commentary on Budget Fight, Defense Industry Situation**

94UM0494A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 7 Jul 94  
p 3

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Unskilled Redistribution of the Budget: Military-Industrial Complex Against the Army"]

[Text] As was to be expected, the fight over the 1994 defense budget ended with a major defeat for the military-industrial lobby. Of course, the president has not yet signed the final version, but no one in the apparatus, in the government or in the Ministry of Defense has any doubt that he soon will sign it and that there will be no additional funds—it will be necessary to exist somehow with what they did give.

Representatives of the Ministry of the Economy and Ministry of Finance quite openly admit that absolutely insufficient funds have been allocated for defense. In accordance with the officially predicted annual inflation of 4.7 times (a deflator), military expenditures should have been R55 trillion in order to preserve the Ministry of Defense budget at the 1993 level. The R37 trillion proposed by the Ministry of Finance, which the State Duma later corrected to 40.6 trillion, reflect neither inflationary expectations nor the Army's actual requirements, but only the fact that the level of military expenditures should not exceed five percent of gross domestic (national) product (GNP). And inasmuch as the Russian GNP is rapidly decreasing with the reduction in level of production, real military expenditures accordingly also are dropping outside of any dependence on the course of Army reforms.

Moreover, the Ministry of Finance makes it no secret that defense expenditures in the present year by no means will be R40.6 trillion as prescribed by the budget, but much less. During five months of 1994 only 17 percent of taxes planned for the year had been collected. If this trend is preserved (which is fully likely), the income part of the budget will be fulfilled by about half or perhaps a bit more. Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance promises to spend for defense actually 60 (in the best case 70) percent of the promised R40.6 trillion in the budget. By the way, this means that in 1994 real military expenditures will end up almost half of those in 1993 with approximately the very same Army. No one either in the Ministry of Defense or in the State Committee for the Defense Industry or (at an unofficial level) in the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of the Economy

takes seriously the promised extrabudgetary funds for saving the Army and military-industrial complex.

The Army was "shorted" 3.2 trillion already in the first half year, when the Ministry of Defense was financed based on R37 trillion for the year. By the way, the distribution of "deficient payments" by military budget items is far from even. The Ministry of Finance is allocating money first of all for Army pay (65 percent of the entire defense budget) to avoid social tension in divisions, regiments and brigades. The debt for pay for the first half year was "only" R162 billion. At the same time, it will be lucky if expenditures for weapon procurements, RDT&E and capital construction are 25 percent of what was previously planned.

It is fully obvious that the extensive process of reducing military expenditures which began in 1992 has reached a limit—the defense budget essentially has been reduced to one item, paying soldiers' salaries. This never was the case even in times of the Roman Empire—at that time there still was at least some kind of capital construction. It is no less obvious that the modern Army and Russia's military industry will not exist stably for any length of time in such an unnatural situation.

The State Committee for the Defense Industry, the main representative of our military-industrial complex in the government, proposes to reduce the Army's numerical strength sharply. Inasmuch as almost the entire budget today goes for Army pay (by 1 January 1995 there are to be 1.9 million servicemen and 600,000 civilian employees in the Ministry of Defense establishment), it seems fully logical to demobilize "excess" officers and men and spend the pay authorized for them to produce new weapons with which it is possible to defend against enemies while having fewer military personnel. Naturally the Ministry of Defense hardly agrees with such a solution. From the standpoint of the economic situation in the country, spending money on Army pay also seemingly is preferable, inasmuch as it will be spent basically on consumption and accordingly will end up in the civilian sector of the economy, but the military-industrial complex really will make new weapons to scare enemies.

The pressure on the government and president by the military-industrial complex unquestionably will grow as the situation deteriorates in numerous militarized regions of Russia, where they awaited the state order for 1994 like manna from heaven in order to restart halted production, but they just did not get anything. And this will be not the meek, weak voice of the State Committee for the Defense Industry, but decisive demands of influential regional leaders and of their representative body, the Federation Council.

But a significant reduction in the Army which would permit financing the defense state order at the expense of discharging officers without apartments and allowances hardly is possible. And not only because in principle this can lead to armed rebellion (which, generally speaking, is

not in our Army's traditions), but first and foremost because then the stockpiles of dangerous weapons accumulated in the country will be left without security and servicing.

The situation more and more acquires the features of an emergency, but for now the numerous organs of executive authority (government, ministries and departments, the presidential apparatus, Security Council and so on), intertwined like tentacles of an octopus, are just tracking the development of events "in a monitoring mode." Everyone understands everything, but no one can do anything, inasmuch as no one is directly subordinate to anyone, and if they are, then they still stubbornly refuse to do anything out of departmental pride or departmental seniority.

## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### Anniversary of Afghan Attack on Russian Border Noted

944Q0474A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Urban: "We Remember You, Brothers! The 12th Outpost Engaged in Uneven Fighting One Year Ago on the Pyandzh"]

[Text] On 13 July of last year, our correspondent Anatoliy Ladin phoned the editorial office from Dushanbe and reported that the Dushmans had attacked the 12th Outpost of the Moscow Border Guards Detachment; the fighting there had been going on since morning; the outpost was completely surrounded... Another call was received a minute later: "Reinforcement is heading to the 12th, and I am leaving for there. Wait for a report in 24 hours."

I admit that at that time we had already grown used to such bad news. Our correspondents were almost constantly going to the Tajik-Afghan border, and information about the situation on the banks of the distant Pyandzh were appearing in almost every issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. But what happened that day upset the consciousness of many.

There were 48 people at the 12th Outpost. A powerful shelling from machineguns and by rocket missiles from the territory of Afghanistan began early in the morning. Then a detachment of Mojahedin and fighters of the Tajik opposition numbering about 200 crossed the border. The fighting lasted 11 hours. A group of 22 border guards led by the outpost chief, Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Mayboroda, and three BMP [infantry combat vehicle] crew members from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division went to the ground, defending a small section of the border.

They were not in the mood for generalizations—on that day they fought above all for themselves and their outpost. We have to summarize this. After all, a resident

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has the right to ask and, incidentally, asked then and is asking now: Why are our lads shedding blood in a "foreign country"? So the "foreign country" will remain on his conscience. A new slaughter has begun in Tajikistan; the war—the reasons are known—will shift into adjacent countries and reach the Russian borders, and even before this will respond with the ruined lives of people "from among the Russian-speaking population" who have become hostages to the situation.

The East—even if it is a subtle matter, in many cases it is quite explainable. The example of Afghanistan—here it is next door. Our troops left, power is changing, and it is hard to understand who is in power, and civil strife continues on the already devastated land. The Mojahedin are penetrating into Tajikistan and working as mercenaries in Nagornyy Karabakh and Bosnia. War has become a way of life for many.

A year ago, the big war did not go farther than the 12th Outpost. The price here was great—young lives. May the memory of the heroes of Pyandzh live forever! Border guards of the 12th Outpost are buried in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belorussia, and in Russian republics and oblasts—in the small homelands. It is as if Christ and Mohammed initially decided to gather them together at the mountain outpost, and then disperse them over their former common land with an alarming reminder that these lads wrote with their blood on the Tajik cliffs: there will be big trouble if we do not protect the borders of the commonwealth at Pyandzh.

Serious reinforcement of the border with Afghanistan began last July. Such tragedies as 13 July are no longer repeated. Although in June of this year alone, there were almost 60 attempts at breaching the border and shelling from the territory of Afghanistan, and a wide-scale offensive by Tajik fighters, with support of the Dushmans, planned for the middle of the month fell through. Understanding that nothing would come about in the area of responsibility of the Pyandzh and Moscow border guard detachments, leaders of the irreconcilable opposition began relocating their detachments to Pamir.

About 1,000 fighters are now concentrated on the border of Afghanistan and Gornyy Badakhshan.

Inside the republic, members of the underground have chosen a new tactic—open terrorism, primarily against people in shoulder boards. Russian border guard officers Vladimir Borisenkov and Sergey Leontikov were killed in Dushanbe. Mikhail Osipov, an officer of the 191st Motorized Rifle Regiment dies in Kurgan-Tyube. Several servicemen of the Tajik Army who fell into an ambush were shot, including Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Ramazan Radzhabon. Meanwhile, the new round of intra-Tajik political talks held in Teheran did not produce the main thing—the sides did not reach a ceasefire understanding. That means the war is not over.

By decision of the authorities in Tajikistan, they are now observing a week in memory of those killed in the 12th Outpost. A monument to the border guard heroes was recently set up here, which was opened by the leaders of the republic. But 13 July is also a day of sorrow for our country. All soldiers who defended the outpost, regardless of their citizenship, have been presented Russian decorations. Lieutenant Andrey Merzlinin, sergeants Sergey Yevlanok and Vladimir Yelizarov (posthumously), and privates Sergey Borik (posthumously) and Igor Filkin (posthumously) became Heroes of the Russian Federation.

And whereas up to now we have not realized, although a whole year has passed, that the tragedy of the 12th Outpost is a nationwide pain and an eternal "black day" on the calendar, that means we still have not become a people respecting themselves. We are doomed to live in a great country, but our descendants will judge how we live. The recollections of the border guards left alive, recorded by our correspondents Anatoliy Ladin, Aleksandr Pelets, Nikolay Poroskov, and Vladimir Zhitarenko and published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA immediately after the tragic events on the Tajik-Afghan border, I am confident, will become an objective reflection of history.

But let this memory also become our conscience.



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